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ABSTRACT: The Supreme Court's denial of class certification in Wal-Mart v.
Dukes has been viewed by many as a wholesale rejection of the use of
discrimination law for social change. In this Article, I argue that the Supreme
Court would have been open to certification had the plaintiffs given more
careful attention to the difficult doctrinal and normative issues raised by their
case. The plaintiffs' evidence suggested significant problems with the treatment
of women at Wal-Mart, but these facts were never tied in any systematic way to
a plausible theory of liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The Wal-Mart Court squarely endorsed the view already adopted by many
lower courts that the common interests required for class certification can be
established only by some examination of the theory to be advanced at trial.
Wal-Mart was a structural lawsuit, one that challenged features of the
workplace that are alleged to produce discriminatory outcomes. Structural suits,
especially those challenging delegated discretion, raise far more difficult issues
that the canonical discrimination case, which focuses on outcomes rather than
on employer practices, and which alleges a clear intent to discriminate.
Structural claims will be politically and morally acceptable only if they are
based on a notion of employer fault such as negligence that is intermediate
between strict liability and intentional discrimination. Although current Title
VII doctrine does not directly provide for intermediate levels of fault, legal
scholars have proposed several thoughtful approaches that would extend
existing law to allow for negligence liability. Plaintiffs could have used these
theories, in conjunction with an emphasis on Title VII's "pattern or practice"
provision, to construct a strong argument that members of the putative class in
Wal-Mart had claims that were tied together by common questions of fact and
law.
The Wal-Mart plaintiffs, however, made no serious effort to address the
merits of their case, much less to advance a theory based on negligence. These
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failures contributed to the disconcertingly broad language in Justice Scalia's
opinion, which in places appears to bar all structural challenges to delegated
discretion. Nonetheless, the opinion does not directly reject negligence theories
and still leaves open some routes for future plaintiffs to use such theories to
challenge delegations of discretion.
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INTRODUCTION
Since its passage, Title VII has allowed plaintiffs to challenge workplace
structures that impede the progress of historically disadvantaged groups. The
nature of these so-called structural lawsuits has evolved over time and today the
most litigated workplace structures are those that delegate subjective decision-
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making power to supervisors, who are alleged by plaintiffs to have exercised
that power in a discriminatory manner.
Last term in Wal-Mart v. Dukes the Court engaged for the first time the
difficult procedural problems surrounding class challenges to structural
discrimination. The Court's denial of class certification has been viewed by
many commentators as a "major blow to working women across America"2
and a wholesale rejection by the Court of the use of discrimination law as an
instrument of social change. 3
In this Article I argue that the result in Wal-Mart was not inevitable. The
plaintiffs' evidence strongly indicated significant problems with the treatment
of women at Wal-Mart, and suggested further that these problems might result
from specific Wal-Mart personnel practices. Yet plaintiffs' counsel failed to
grapple with many difficult doctrinal and policy problems underlying structural
class actions, especially those challenging delegated discretion.
Legal attacks on workplace structures have often been the subject of heated
debate, and even commentators who support structural challenges have noted
that these suits raise difficult normative and legal issues. A broad public and
judicial consensus supports the paradigmatic discrimination suit, which focuses
on whether an adverse employment outcome was the result of intentional
discrimination. In contrast, a structural suit focuses on facially neutral features
of the workplace that tend to produce discriminatory outcomes. Imposing
liability for such structures does not fit comfortably into conventional Title VII
doctrine, which delineates two discrete classes of wrongdoing, disparate
treatment and disparate impact. This distinction has traditionally been seen as
marking two extremes on the continuum of fault, with disparate treatment
predicated on conscious intent to discriminate and disparate impact imposed on
a quasi-strict liability basis. Neither of these extremes is well-suited to
structural claims. Only in rare cases will central management evidence the kind
of clearly wrongful purpose that deserves the moral condemnation rightly
associated with intentional discrimination. However, strict liability shifts to
employers the burden of a society-wide problem and creates flawed incentives
for the development of personnel practices.
1. The Court had earlier addressed related problems, most importantly when it held that subjective
decision-making was a practice subject to disparate impact analysis. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988). However, Watson was not a class action and its holding raised many issues
that were not addressed by the Court until Wal-Mart.
2. Courtney Martin, Wal-Mart v. Dukes Ruling is Out of Sync with 21st-Century Sex
Discrimination, CHRISTIAN SCL MONITOR (June 22, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/
Opinion/2011/0622/Wal-Mart-v.-Dukes-ruling-is-out-of-sync-with-2 1st-century-sex-discrimination.
3. Richard Primus, The Individual, Above All, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2011, 12:21 PM),
http://www.nytimcs.com/roomfordebate/2011/06/20/a-death-blow-to-class-action/thc-individual-above-
all; see also Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?, 37 AKRON L. REV.
813 (2004) [hereinafter Hart, Employment Discrimination] (pre-Wal-Mart, suggesting that concerns
about class certification are driven not by procedural issues but by doubts about the value of class
actions, especially in employment cases).
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Scholars have long questioned the adequacy of a distinction that makes no
provision for intermediate levels of fault. The right to choose among workplace
practices is in general a legitimate employer prerogative. Judicial intervention
will be politically and morally acceptable only if it is based on some notion of
employer fault such as negligence that is intermediate between strict liability
and the core concept of purposeful differential treatment. Scholars have
struggled to fit negligence theories into existing doctrine and have proposed
several thoughtful approaches. Most agree that the punitive damages authorized
by the 1991 Amendments to the original Act are inappropriate under a
negligence theory. Some commentators go further, suggesting that
compensatory damages be limited to the two years' back pay authorized by the
original Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Structural lawsuits are also complicated by procedural problems, especially
when subjective personnel practices are challenged. Rule 23(a) requires that
class litigation present "questions of law or fact common to the class." In
cases of delegated discretion, this requirement raises difficult questions.
Structural problems have an inherently collective character that seems suited to
class actions; the discriminatory effects of a workplace practice are best
evaluated in the context of the overall pattern of outcomes in a workplace.
However, the existence of a common question is not always obvious when each
member has been harmed by the individual decisions of an independent
supervisor acting without explicit corporate guidance. Especially in disparate
treatment claims, the existence of common questions seems most plausible
when a class action is conceived as a violation of the pattern or practice
provision of Title VII than when a class action is viewed as an aggregation of
individual claims. In addition, I argue, a focus on the pattern or practice
provision provides a previously unrecognized opening for introducing an
intermediate culpability standard into disparate treatment claims.
Structural class actions must also balance the goal of long-term change
through collective remedies against the goal of individual compensation.
Common questions are necessary but not sufficient for class certification: the
common core must be large enough that common adjudication will serve the
goals of justice and judicial economy.5 The relative role of common questions
and the appropriateness of class certification shrink as questions specific to
individual members increase. Consequently, certifying a class under Rule 23(b)
may require focusing on class-wide injunctive relief while limiting requests for
individual compensatory damages. Although this result may be dictated by the
4. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a).
5. Rule 23(b)(3) explicitly requires that common questions predominate, while Rules 23(b)(1) and
(b)(2) do so implicitly by requiring a request for injunctive relief that is common to all class members
either by its terms or because separate suits might establish inconsistent standards.
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rules governing class actions, I suggest that it would be entirely consistent with
the policies underlying structural claims.
The analytic difficulties surrounding structural class actions are daunting,
and reasonable observers will disagree about the ideal approach. The Wal-Mart
plaintiffs could not be faulted had they simply failed to craft a perfect theory of
liability. Their strategy, however, failed in far more fundamental ways. The
Wal-Mart Court began by affirming a principle that had already emerged in the
lower courts: class litigation requires examining the legal theory that will be
presented at trial to determine whether a core set of issues is common to class
members. The Wal-Mart plaintiffs' claimed that Wal-Mart's strong corporate
culture was a "conduit"6 that permitted discriminatory attitudes to "infect"7 the
subjective decision-making processes of its supervisors. This strategy contained
several critical mistakes. First, the idea of a "conduit of infection" was a
metaphor, not a legal theory. Plaintiffs nominally advanced both a disparate
impact and a disparate treatment claim but made no serious effort to situate
their conduit theory within these traditional legal categories. Second, to the
extent that a specific claim could be discerned, it was inconsistent with
widespread notions of what is fair in structural cases. Plaintiffs suggested that
central Wal-Mart management had a deliberate intent to discriminate on the
basis of sex. The tone of their argument and their request for punitive damages
implied the high degree of moral culpability associated with the most serious
type of disparate treatment. Yet their evidence did not indicate anything like
what the majority of judges or the public would view as a consistent and
conscious purpose to discriminate by Wal-Mart management. By claiming a
degree of fault beyond what their evidence could support, the Wal-Mart
plaintiffs asked the Court to go too far past the boundaries of the broadly-held
normative foundation for attacking structural discrimination. Without a
plausible and clearly specified legal theory, the plaintiffs could not establish the
"questions of law or fact common to the class"8 required for certification.
Legal realists might argue that many members of the current Court are
unsympathetic to discrimination plaintiffs, and that no doctrinal refinements
could have persuaded them to rule in the plaintiffs' favor. Certainly some
Justices have views that might incline them against plaintiffs, but at the oral
argument both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy indicated that they
were open to a theory of notice liability, a variety of negligence. The plaintiffs
failed to pursue this suggestion, and both Justices voted to deny certification.
The failings of the Wal-Mart plaintiffs contributed to the disconcertingly
broad language in Justice Scalia's opinion, which in places appears to bar all
6. Brief for Respondents at 13, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 10-
277).
7. Id. at 46; see also Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2548; id. at 2563 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
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structural challenges to delegated discretion. Nonetheless, the opinion does not
directly reject negligence theories and still leaves open some routes for future
plaintiffs to present these theories. In this Article, I attempt to chart a course for
future litigants seeking to certify structural class actions. Part I discusses how
the fundamentally flawed dichotomy between disparate impact and disparate
treatment complicates the analysis of structural cases and why negligence
liability would be superior on policy grounds. Although negligence theories are
not well-recognized under Title VII, they have some basis in existing law. Part
II examines the issues raised by the class litigation of structural suits. Class
certification requires courts to consider merits issues that bear on commonality.
Commonality issues bedevil cases of delegated discretion, which involve
decentralized decisions by a large number of supervisors. Part II suggests that a
carefully developed disparate impact claim should generally meet the
commonality requirement. Commonality in disparate treatment claims presents
more difficult issues and can be justified only by giving the pattern or practice
provision of Title VII closer attention than it has previously received. That
provision, I argue, has previously unnoted implications for culpability issues,
suggesting that the entity should be held to a negligence standard for intentional
discrimination by supervisors. A pattern-or-practice negligence theory provides
the common question that would be absent if a class disparate treatment claim
were presented as an aggregation of individual claims. However, though the
common question of negligence may be enough to warrant class-wide
injunctive relief and attorney's fees, it will not justify punitive damages and
may limit the availability of compensatory damages.
Part III examines the Wal-Mart litigation, beginning with the evidence
presented, the lower court opinions, and the plaintiffs' Supreme Court brief.
None of these specified any clear theory of liability, much less one grounded in
relatively new concepts like negligence. Part III then examines the oral
argument at the Supreme Court, stressing the plaintiffs' failure to take
advantage of the negligence theory based on notice suggested by several
Justices, including two who ultimately sided with Wal-Mart. The resulting
opinion by Justice Scalia contains broad language that may impede the claims
of future plaintiffs who offer a well-developed negligence theory. Future
courts may be willing to interpret Wal-Mart narrowly, but only if plaintiffs do
not overreach by asserting more culpability and requesting higher damages than
are plausible in structural cases.
I. TITLE VII'S DEFECTIVE DICHOTOMY
The basic doctrinal framework of Title VII recognizes only two types of
liability, one based on intentional discrimination and the other on
impermissible effects. This distinction has been widely criticized by scholars
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for failing to provide explicitly for intermediate standards of culpability such as
negligence. This Part explores the general policy case for negligence liability
and its special application to cases of structural discrimination.
A. The Basic Framework of Title VII Liability
The central provision of Title VII states that it shall be an "unlawful
employment practice" for an employer to discriminate against any individual
because of membership in a protected class.9 Initially through judicial decision
and now partially by statute, discrimination law distinguishes between two
species of unlawful practice. A plaintiff claiming disparate treatment must
show the defendant's intent to discriminate based on protected class
membership. In contrast, a disparate impact plaintiff need not prove intent but
instead must show that a given employer practice has had a disparate impact on
a protected class. Because fault has not been claimed, the defendant is then
given the opportunity to prove that the practice was justified by business
necessity, a defense which is unavailable under a disparate treatment theory.
The early disparate impact cases involved a test or educational requirement that
burdened a group whose members had suffered discrimination in the
educational system. Since 1991, different remedies have been available for
the two theories, attesting to the difference in moral censure attached to each
type of behavior. Under either theory, plaintiffs may receive injunctive relief,
two years' back pay, and attorney's fees," but for disparate treatment cases,
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 further authorized awards of full compensatory
damages and even punitive damages. 12
The vast majority of discrimination suits involve an individual plaintiff
alleging disparate treatment under the central prohibition of "unlawful
employment practice[s]." The canonical claim asserts a relatively conscious
and deliberate decision to use protected class status in making employment
decisions. The requirements for proving such claims are the subject of
controversy, but the fundamental moral legitimacy of these claims is not.
Title VII also authorizes the Attorney General to bring a civil action
against an employer who engages in a "pattern or practice of resistance to the
full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by [Title VII]." 13 The Supreme
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
10. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971).
11. Under either disparate impact or disparate treatment theory, a court that finds an unlawful
employment practice "may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice,
and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to ...
back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1)
(2006). The prevailing party may also receive attorney's fecs.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)(2006).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2006).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a) (2006).
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Court has held that pattern or practice analysis also applies to private class
actions, 14 and pattern or practice suits filed either by the government or by
private classes are often called systemic claims. In some pattern or practice
suits, plaintiffs allege disparate treatment in the form of widespread conscious
discrimination from the top management down through the line supervisors.
In the strongest cases, the facts suggest a corporate-level policy, sometimes
only thinly disguised, of discrimination against members of a protected class.
That such a policy would violate Title VII is uncontroversial although, as in
individual suits, the requisite evidence of intent is much disputed.
B. The Straitjacket Criticized
Remedies, proof patterns and available defenses all turn on whether
liability is based on disparate treatment or disparate impact, yet many
troublesome situations cannot comfortably be analyzed in the treatment/impact
framework. The framework has been widely criticized by commentators;
Professor Noah Zatz has called it a "theoretical straitjacket with two arms."' 6
This straitjacket creates problems in a wide variety of cases by requiring that
problematic conduct be analyzed using proof patterns that do not capture the
salient features of the conduct and by requiring the imposition of an
implausibly bifurcated degree of condemnation.
The deficiencies of the treatment/impact framework became a central focus
of scholarly attention in the 1990s as commentators considered the problem of
unconscious discrimination.' 7 The overwhelming majority of Americans today
believe that discrimination is wrong, and the overt discrimination targeted by
Title VII in 1964 has become a relatively small problem. Yet social science
evidence suggests the continued existence of unconscious bias that may be
manifested in incremental and almost invisible decisions by individual
supervisors.
14. Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 876 n.9 (1984) ("the clcments of a
prima facie pattern-or-practice case are the same in a private class action.").
15. See, e.g., Wright v. Stern, 450 F. Supp. 2d 335 (2006).
16. Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and the
Disaggregation ofDiscriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1366 (2009).
17. The first article systematically exploring unconscious bias focused on constitutional problems.
Charles R. Lawrence 1Il, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,
39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). The foundational articles on Title Vll issues are David Benjamin
Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 899 (1993) and Linda Hamilton Krieger,
The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995).
18. Krieger, supra note 17. A voluminous subsequent literature draws on the empirical evidence of
unconscious bias. Some representative articles include Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace
Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
91 (2003) [hereinafter Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics]; Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda
Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945 (2006); Melissa Hart,
Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REv. 741 (2005) [hereinafter
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The importance of unconscious motive suggests that the mental states that
might play a role in discriminatory outcomes are not readily dichotomized into
two classes, intentional or non-intentional. A decision motivated by
unconscious views about the protected class is generally agreed to be
discrimination,1 9 but its status as "intentional" is less clear. "Intent" refers to a
state of mind, and is almost by definition conscious. Yet treating unconscious
discrimination as wholly unintentional is analytically unsatisfying because it
suggests that motive is irrelevant. 20 The analysis is further complicated when
discriminatory action is taken not by the employer itself but by one of its
agents. In agency cases, conscious states other than intent seem relevant to
liability. Suppose two employers, A and B, sincerely wish to make non-
discriminatory decisions and both choose facially neutral personnel procedures.
Once instituted, however, these procedures appear to have a discriminatory
impact, because the employers persistently hire and promote disproportionately
low numbers of members of the protected class.21 Employer A did not (and had
no reason to) foresee the effects of the procedure. Employer B anticipated the
possibility of disparate effects and did not consider mitigating measures.
Although the two firms do not seem equally culpable, current doctrine does not
allow any straightforward way of distinguishing these cases.
In an important and influential article, Professor David Benjamin
Oppenheimer argued that in the absence of clear, conscious intent, liability
based on negligence principles is often preferable to either a requirement of
intent or strict liability.22 Title VII, he argued, obligates employers to guard
against their own unconscious bias and that of their agents, and to consider the
Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking]; Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 969 (2006); and Ann C. McGinley, !Viva La Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious
Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415 (2000). Some of this literature makes use of the
Implicit Association Test (IAT), which measures a subject's non-conscious association of members of a
group with certain generalizations and compares that with the subject's self-described views. The extent
to which the IAT predicts a propensity to engage in discriminatory behavior is not yet clearly
established. R. Richard Banks, Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Lee Ross, Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a
Racially Unequal Society, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1188 (2006); Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock,
Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023 (2006). However,
substantial evidence of discriminatory behavior outside the IAT framework does exist, Deborah Weiss,
The Annoyingly Indeterminate Effects of Sex Differences, 19 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 99, 138-41 (2010)
[hereinafter Weiss, Annoyingly Indeterminate], and IAT research suggests that this behavior may be
unconscious.
19. Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?: Law,
Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, 1072-1102 (2009); Linda Hamilton Krieger &
Susan T. Fiskc, Behavioral realism in employment discrimination law: Implicit bias and disparate
treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1053-56 (2006); Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND.
L.J. 1129, 1229-30 (1999).
20. Krieger, supra note 17, at 1231, 1243 (suggesting motive rather than intent is the critical feature
of disparate treatment and arguing that "subjective practices discrimination is a disparate treatment
problem, not a disparate impact problem, and it requires a disparate treatment solution.").
21. Here and elsewhere the discussion assumes that the benchmark for ascertaining whether the
numbers are disproportionately low is the qualified relevant labor market. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
22. Oppenheimer, supra note 17.
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probable or known consequences of neutral policies. Yet the potential burden
of avoiding all discriminatory effects is high, cautioning against strict
liability.23 And failure to institute cost-justified measures may not be the moral
equivalent of intentional discrimination: "[N]egligent discrimination need not
and ought not to be viewed as morally reprehensible conduct .... Even the best
[employers] will inadvertently fail to exercise due care on occasion."24 Many
commentators have concurred with the basic themes of Oppenheimer's
proposal: an insistence that most discrimination results from intentional
conduct is misguided and a wider range of culpability standards, including
negligence, should be available under Title VII. 25
The courts, Oppenheimer argued, have tacitly acknowledged the
importance of intermediate standards of liability in certain areas of
26discrimination law, including disparate impact jurisprudence. In early cases,
the bar of business necessity was set high and disparate impact was virtually a
doctrine of strict liability.27 Over the years, the defense available to employers
vacillated, eventually moving somewhat toward a doctrine that relieved
employers of liability if they had exercised due care in preventing
discrimination. This movement, however, occurred in an unsystematic way that
never gave employers a clear sense of their responsibilities.28 Oppenheimer
23. Id.at921.
24. Id. at 971.
25. See Melissa Hart, The Possibility of Avoiding Discrimination: Considering Compliance and
Liability, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1623, 1647-48 (2007) (liability inappropriate for defendants who adopt best
practices that prove less than fully effective) [hereinafter Hart, Possibility]; Kricger, supra note 17, at
1243-46 (recommending two-tier liability, with limitations on damages when no conscious intent to
discriminate proved); Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47
WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 1001-02 (2005) (advocating use of a variation of disparate impact and
noting its similarity to Oppenheimer's proposal); J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment
Discrimination Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 273 (1995) (recommending notice-based negligence liability in
individual cases but strict liability in non-structural class actions); Zatz, supra note 16, at 1436-39; see
also Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of
Discriminatory Intent, 91 MIcH. L. REV. 953, 985-92 (1993) (undesirability of focus on blame and intent
in Constitutional race discrimination analysis). For a partially dissenting voice arguing that the
characterization of wrongful behavior as intentional serves important goals but still allowing some
defense that alternative measures are infeasible, see Tristin K. Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate
Treatment Law, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 447-49), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1793425; Tristin K. Green, A Structural
Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849, 885-900
(2007) [hereinafter Green, Structural Approach]; Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra
note 18, at 146-51. Professor Samuel Bagenstos approves of intermediate standards in principle but is
pessimistic about whether they can be realistically implemented in light of the difficulty of defining
what constitutes due care. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 35 (2006). Professor Michael Selmi likewise approves of
an intermediate standard in principle, but is skeptical that courts would be willing to impose liability
without a showing of intent. Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 701, 773-74 (2006) [hereinafter Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?].
26. Oppenheimer, supra note 17, at 931-34. Negligence principles can also be discerned in
employer obligations to accommodate certain employee characteristics, id. at 936-44, and in the law
governing employer liability for harassment by supervisors and co-workers, Zatz, supra note 16.
27. Oppenheimer, supra note 17, at 920-21.
28. Id. at 917-67.
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argued that courts should openly and explicitly announce a negligence-based
theory of liability that clearly delineates the level of care to which employers
should be held.
C. Negligence as a Foundation for Structural Suits
Structural suits today raise many difficult issues surrounding unconscious
intent. Both classic and structural discrimination suits, whether by an individual
or a class, challenge adverse employment outcomes. Structural discrimination
suits, however, also draw attention to the workplace practices that arguably
produce these outcomes. The term "structural suit" is somewhat elastic since
the precise role played by the challenged structure may vary. A pure structural
suit directly challenges a specified practice and requests relief in the form of an
injunction to change the practice. A suit that requests only monetary relief may
be considered in some sense structural if it attempts to prove the existence of a
discriminatory outcome in part by evidence concerning workplace structures
conducive to discrimination. Structural suits have been brought under both
disparate impact and disparate treatment theories, although the issue of which is
more appropriate remains open and will be discussed at more length later.
The structural features most often challenged have changed over the years.
In the first decades of Title VII, plaintiffs often contested tests and hiring
channels.29 The problem of discrimination in the workplace has changed with
the passage of time as the workplace itself has evolved. Structural suits
typically involve large corporations where supervisors rather than central
management make critical decisions about individual workers. In the past,
tightly controlled work environments often constrained the discretion of
supervisors, an approach that is often replaced today with more fluid
organizational styles. 30 As a result, the evaluation of employee performance
often allows for more subjectivity than it did in the past. A firm that delegates
the power to make subjective evaluations without providing guidance or
constraints may allow discriminatory attitudes to enter the evaluation, and such
delegation is the most contentious issue in structural litigation today. 31
Structural problems can occur in a wide variety of factual settings. Cases in
which management deliberately chooses personnel policies in order to
29. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540
U.S. 44 (2003) (hiring channel); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (hiring
channel); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (test).
30. Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing
Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001).
31. In the academic literature, the notion of structural discrimination is now virtually synonymous
with the problem of unconstrained subjectivity. The foundational article on structural discrimination was
Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 458 (2001).
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discriminate are probably rare and in any event constitute classic rather than
structural discrimination. More often, personnel policies will be chosen for
neutral reasons. Sometimes these policies are chosen with care to avoid
discriminatory consequences, while at other times they are not. Sometimes
discriminatory consequences are foreseeable, and sometimes they are not. After
policies are implemented, management may or may not receive notice of any
discriminatory consequences, and if it does, it may or may not reexamine its
policies.
These widely varying scenarios make negligence-based liability especially
appropriate in structural lawsuits. Professor Samuel Bagenstos has noted that
courts and the public are reluctant to impose liability without fault, a reluctance
that contributes to the relative unpopularity of those versions of disparate
impact that most closely approach strict liability. 32 Strict liability effectively
makes the employer an insurance company,33 and public opinion does not and
perhaps should not support making employers bear the burden of society-wide
ills.
If the public and judiciary are reluctant to impose strict liability without
any suggestion of fault, they are even less willing to label conduct as more
blameworthy than the evidence indicates. 34 In structural cases, intent to
discriminate is seldom conscious even among supervisors and may be absent at
the central corporate level. To stigmatize such behavior with the same label
attached to conscious and intentional discrimination seriously undermines the
judicial and public willingness to impose liability in structural cases. Professor
Katharine Bartlett has argued that mislabeling may backfire on a broader scale,
creating resentment about the law's demands and reducing the extent to which
the public internalizes the norms of anti-discrimination law. 35
Policy towards structural discrimination must also confront a difficult fact:
evidence about the effectiveness of various personnel policies in preventing
discrimination is at present incomplete and contested. This uncertainty
contributes to public and judicial unease about liability. Monetary damages
may seem unfair if employers have no clear way of preventing harm. Judges
32. Bagenstos, supra note 25, at 40-43; see also George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact,
Discrimination, and the Essentially Contested Concept of Equality, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313 (2006);
Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, supra note 25.
33. Verkerke, supra note 25, at 323.
34. Bagenstos, supra note 25, at 40.
35. Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation in
Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893 (2009).
36. Hart, Possibility, supra note 25, at 1644-48; Gregory Mitchell, Good Scholarly Intentions Do
Not Guarantee Good Policy, 95 VA. L. REV. 109, 110-15 (2010); Sturm, supra note 31; Verkerke, supra
note 25, at 330; Wax, supra note 19, at 1158-69.
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feel, not without reason, that they lack the institutional competence to resolve a
controversial and technical debate. 37
Uncertainty also greatly complicates efforts to analyze the incentive effects
of various liability rules, an issue that has been extensively examined by
Professor J. Hoult Verkerke. 38 Professor Verkerke identifies an important
group of negligence rules which he calls notice liability rules. The central
function of notice liability is to create appropriate incentives for investment in
information, and a notice liability rule specifies a pre-notice standard of care, a
definition of notice, and a post-notice standard of care.39 In the discrimination
context virtually any plausible negligence rule would be some type of notice
rule and this Article will use the term "negligence" to encompass notice
theories.
40Negligence and strict liability create different incentives. A negligence
rule requires courts to determine standards defining what preventive measures
are appropriate and creates an incentive for an employer to meet those
standards: the employer will not be liable even if discrimination occurs as long
as its efforts meet the applicable standard of care.4 ' A strict liability rule leaves
the decision about appropriate preventive measures in the hands of employers:
they will decide whether it is cheaper to take precautions against discrimination
or simply to treat discrimination liability as a cost of doing business.
When the effectiveness of employer measures is relatively certain, strict
liability may be preferable to negligence. A central corporate management that
has intentionally instituted discriminatory policies can reduce discrimination by
rescinding those policies. Here, strict entity liability for employment decisions
is appropriate. As long as a discriminatory outcome can be demonstrated, the
law should require no further showing of culpability. 42 Where intent at the
corporate level is more ambiguous, the choice of liability rule is more
difficult. 43 On the one hand, a negligence rule requires courts to decide what
preventive measures are appropriate, a role to which they are never well-
suited," and which is complicated by the uncertainty about the best way to
37. Bagenstos, supra note 25, at 25-26; Deborah M. Weiss, The Misplaced Modesty of Title VII
Jurisprudence (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Weiss, Misplaced
Modesty].
38. Verkerke, supra note 25.
39. Id. at 318.
40. In simple settings, strict liability and negligence will both produce efficient levels of efforts to
prevent discrimination. Id. at 323.
41. Id.at321.
42. Id. at 323.
43. Professor Verkerke's article was written before structural discrimination became a central
concern of discrimination policy and he does not explicitly discuss this case. He focuses instead on the
issues surrounding sexual harassment. However, his general analytic framework remains central to any
analysis of notice-based negligence liability. Weiss, Misplaced Modesty, supra note 37 (explaining
different treatment of structural and harassment claims).
44. Bagenstos, supra note 25, at 21-26.
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prevent discrimination.45 On the other hand, without clear evidence about
preventive measures, strict liability encourages employers to accept
discrimination liability as a cost of doing business rather than to search for
ways of reducing it.46 Balancing these considerations is difficult, but many
observers have concluded that the best option may be a due care rule that
stresses good faith rather than requiring perfection. Such a rule will encourage
firms to experiment with various approaches to prevention, leading to improved
understanding of what works and what does not.47
II. CLASS LITIGATION OF STRUCTURAL CLAIMS
The central contention of the Wal-Mart plaintiffs was a classic challenge to
workplace structures: Wal-Mart's corporate culture and personnel practices,
they argued, had facilitated discrimination by Wal-Mart supervisors. The merits
of this structural claim were not directly before the Supreme Court, which
instead considered only whether the large nationwide class-potentially the
largest in history-could be certified. However, even before the Supreme
Court's decision in Wal-Mart, lower courts had moved toward the view that
certification decisions required some consideration of the plaintiffs theory of
recovery. Part II examines the relevant law on certification and the merits of
structural claims as it existed before Wal-Mart and suggests how the Wal-Mart
plaintiffs might have used that law to construct their case. Disparate impact
doctrine already contains certain negligence-like themes and can provide
structural plaintiffs with a plausible theory that supports the common interests
required for class certification. Commonality in structural disparate treatment
claims presents more difficult issues and can be justified only by giving the
pattern or practice provision of Title VII closer attention than it has previously
received. In this Part, I argue that that provision has previously unnoted
implications for culpability issues, suggesting that an entity should be held to a
negligence standard for intentional discrimination by supervisors. This
negligence-based theory of disparate treatment should satisfy the common
question requirement of Rule 23(a). However, policy considerations and the
requirements of Rule 23(b) impose restrictions on the remedies available in
negligence-based claims under both disparate impact and disparate treatment
theories.
45. Verkerke, supra note 25, at 330 ("[A] far more important goal for employment discrimination
liability should be to induce employers to undertake a wide range of experiments with alternative
employment practices and policies.").
46. Id. at 323.
47. Mitchell, supra note 36, at 115; Verkerke, supra note 25, at 323.
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A. The Evolving Law of Class Certification
At the center of any certification question is whether the members of the
class have suffered a common wrong because of the defendant. The theme of a
common wrong appears in many forms but most clearly in Rule 23(a)(2),
which permits certification only if "there are questions of law or fact common
to the class."4 8 The modem class action is less than fifty years old, and many
fundamental questions surrounding commonality remain unresolved.
The difficulty of ascertaining the existence of common questions varies
widely between cases. Where victims of an airplane crash sue an airline for
negligence, the existence of a common question is trivial. The members of the
potential class have self-evidently suffered a common injury from a common
cause, and all of their claims turn on an indivisible question of negligence. In
other situations, however, the existence of both a common injury and a
common cause may be open to question. Consider a corporation that makes
actionable misrepresentations exaggerating the value of its publicly traded
securities. Defining a class of buyers who were harmed is far more difficult
than defining a class of passengers harmed in an airplane crash. For example,
does an individual buyer's right to recover depend on personal knowledge of
the misrepresentation? This is a substantive question of securities law, but also
critical to determining the scope of common classes of buyers.
For the last thirty years, lower courts have struggled to reconcile two
Supreme Court pronouncements on the determination of the common interests
central to class certification. In the 1974 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, the
Court cautioned judges not to undertake "a preliminary inquiry into the merits
of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class
action."50 This passage was read by many courts to dictate strict separation of
merits issues from the certification issue, a view that came to be known as the
Eisen rule. Eight years later, in General Telephone Co. v. Falcon, an
employment discrimination case, the Court noted that "sometimes it may be
necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on
the certification question."s For much of the next twenty years, courts tended
to resolve the apparent tension between these cases in favor of deferential
readings of the plaintiffs' assertions during the class certification phase.
In the mid-2000s, the tide began to turn. The new consensus among courts
was exemplified by the Second Circuit's opinion in In re Initial Public
Offerings Securities Litigation,52 which dealt with a securities law question of
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
49. The class action became significant only after the 1966 amendments added Rule 23 to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
50. 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974).
51. 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982).
52. 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006).
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the kind described above. The court concluded that class certification requires a
"definitive assessment" that all Rule 23 requirements have been met, even
when such determinations require the resolution of factual issues that overlap
with merits issues, although no aspect of the merits unrelated to a Rule 23
requirement should be examined. However, determinations made for
purposes of class certification do not bind any subsequent court deciding the
merits of the case.54
During the same period, legal scholars also began to stress the problems
that might result from failure to examine the merits of a suit during the
certification phase. Professors Robert Bone and David Evans noted that the
Eisen rule as interpreted by many courts consisted not merely of a rigid
separation of merits and certification issues but also of a policy favoring the
grant of certification. The presumption in favor of certification, they argued,
creates unfair pressure on defendants to settle frivolous lawsuits after
certification to avoid trial."
A somewhat different set of concerns was raised by Professor Richard
Nagareda, who focused on institutional rather than cost-related issues.5 7 He
noted the potential of class certification to affect the substantive rights of
parties in violation of the Rules Enabling Act, which delegates to the Supreme
Court the power to prescribe rules of practice and procedure but provides that
those rules shall not "abridge, enlarge or modify" preexisting rights. A class
action, therefore, must be built on preexisting rights accorded to individuals by
sources of law other than the procedural rules for class actions. Since
certification almost invariably leads to settlement, the certification of classes
53. Id. at 41.
54. Id.
55. Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE
L.J. 1251, 1289 (2001).
56. This presumption in favor of certification was evidently based on the view that false denials
were more costly than false grants, which was in turn based on two premises: (1) class actions often
advance broad policy goals that would be frustrated by strict gate-keeping at the certification stage and
(2) an erroneous grant is reversible while an erroneous denial is not. Id. at 1286. Bone and Evans point
out a number of problems with this reasoning. Most importantly, by overlooking the role of settlement,
it significantly understates the costs of certification. Class certification puts great pressure on defendants
to settle. This results in recovery for plaintiffs even in suits that would be unlikely to succeed at trial.
More subtly, since certification is in practice seldom revisited by the court, plaintiffs recover in cases
where they should succeed on the merits if they sued as individuals but where certification is
inappropriate because the requirements of Rule 23 are not fulfilled. Id. at 1291-1305. Further, they
argue, the consequences of false denial have been somewhat overstated, since plaintiffs can proceed
individually or seek certification in narrower classes. Id. at 1305-11. The cost of false denials is highest
when these disaggregated proceedings may produce inconsistent injunctive orders. Id. at 1307-08. But
see Charles Silver, "We're Scared to Death ": Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1357 (2003) (arguing that the pressure to settle created by class actions has been greatly exaggerated).
57. The distinction between institutional and cost-based concerns is not a sharp one, and Nagareda
in some ways differs from Bone and Evans in tone and emphasis rather than in underlying principles.
See Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103
COLUM. L. REv. 149, 189-98 (2003) [hereinafter Nagareda, Preexistence Principle].
58. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
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that do not truly share common questions disrupts two fundamental allocations
of decision-making power. By potentially enlarging substantive rights in
contravention of the Rules Enabling Act, it transfers legislative power to the
judiciary.5 9 By encouraging settlement after the certification order, it delegates
to private class attorneys a law-making role that properly belongs to the
legislature.60
To ensure that certification does not have these effects, both
Bone and Evans and Nagareda proposed that courts examine the merits of a
case to the extent required to ascertain the existence of a common question, and
suggested that this task might require a far deeper inquiry into factual questions
than previously recognized.61 Bone and Evans also advanced a more ambitious
proposal in which a judge would assess the plaintiffs' entire case and certify a
class only if the plaintiffs meet a "likelihood of success" standard that was set
below the level needed to prevail at trial.62
During the course of the Wal-Mart litigation these commentators noted that
Wal-Mart presented an unusually powerful example of the rationale behind the
new certification jurisprudence. Whether a common question existed was
inseparable from the merits issue of whether the plaintiffs' claims were tied
together by a cognizable structural problem in the employer's workplace.
Professor Nagareda noted that the "class certification granted by the district
court in Dukes . . . advances the structural discrimination account in functional
terms, but potentially without a court ever determining its correctness as an
interpretation of Title VII."63 To solve this circularity problem, a satisfactory
certification analysis in Wal-Mart would therefore require a determination of
whether challenges to delegated discretion are generally cognizable under Title
VII. However, in systemic discrimination cases the argument for significant
merits review at the certification stage extends beyond the circularity problem.
The policy considerations behind Title VII require that future employers have
adequate notice of which policies will pass muster under Title VII and which
will not. If all class actions settle, only relatively specific analysis of the merits
at the certification stage can provide this information.
Wal-Mart presented the Supreme Court with its first occasion to consider
the new certification jurisprudence, and overwhelming arguments supported a
move towards more extensive consideration of the merits during certification.
59. See Nagarcda, Preexistence Principle, supra note 57, at 189-90.
60. See id. at 189-98; see also Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age ofAggregate
Proof 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 133-63 (2009) [hereinafter Nagareda, Aggregate Proof]. Although an
integrated position emerges from these two articles, Professor Nagareda does not draw the two
arguments together as explicitly as he might have. Preexistence Principle focuses on whether plaintiffs
should be able to opt out of classes, while Aggregate Prooffocuses on the certification problem.
61. Nagareda, Aggregate Proof supra note 60, at 171-73.
62. Bone & Evans, supra note 55, at 1329.
63. Nagareda, Aggregate Proof supra note 60, at 161; see also Robert G. Bone, Sorting Through
the Certification Muddle, 63 VAND. L. REv. EN BANC 105, 106 (2010).
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A far more difficult question was presented by the merits determination itself.
Title VII doctrine governing structural suits was (and is) highly unsettled. Wal-
Mart thus required the Court to decide the role of merits determinations in all
class certifications while addressing difficult substantive issues governing
structural lawsuits. Nagareda, writing in the middle of the litigation, suggested
that a Supreme Court decision for plaintiffs in Wal-Mart would "upend" the
substantive law governing structural challenges.6 Certainly a reading of the
plaintiffs' position might leave this impression, and no doubt a decision in
favor of the Wal-Mart plaintiffs would have represented some expansion of
Title VII. In the next Section, I argue that the expansion of Title VII needed by
the Wal-Mart plaintiffs was not dramatic. The existing scholarly literature
contains many analyses of substantive Title VII principles that might have
helped plaintiffs, although fewer works examine in detail the connection
between these principles and the problem of class certification. 65 More careful
development of the plaintiffs' argument might have demonstrated greater
continuity between prior Title VII doctrine and at least certain types of
structural discrimination claims.
B. The Doctrinal Basis ofNegligence Liability For Structural Cases
Structural class actions are most likely to succeed if they provide a theory
of liability that appeals to the moral intuitions of judges. As I argued in Part I,
the theories mostly likely to have such appeal are based on some version of
negligence liability, which establishes a standard of moral culpability
intermediate between the heavy condemnation reserved for discriminatory
intent and the no-fault strict liability that disparate impact theory approaches.
In this Section, I explore how structural plaintiffs might best situate a
negligence-based claim within existing doctrine.
A theory of liability in structural class actions must not only have intuitive
appeal but must also satisfy the common question requirement. In this Section,
I show how structural plaintiffs may arrive at a common question through
either disparate treatment or disparate impact theories. Disparate impact theory
provides a relatively straightforward route to the common question required for
certification and an only somewhat more complex route to a substantive
negligence theory. However, structural disparate treatment claims are more
difficult: they do not fit simply into existing substantive Title VII law, and as
often framed they do not present a clear common question. This Section
suggests that the pattern or practice provision of Title VII can be used to craft a
64. Nagareda, Aggregate Proof supra note 60, at 161.
65. Two useful examinations of the connection are Tristin K. Green, Targeting Workplace Context:
Title VII as a Tool for Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 659, 690-705 (2003) and Hart,
Employment Discrimination, supra note 3.
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viable structural disparate treatment claim based on a negligence theory of
liability.
1. Disparate Treatment
a) "Pattern or Practice of Resistance"66 as Negligence Standard
under Title VII
Individual discrimination suits are brought under the central provision of
Title VII which makes discrimination based on protected class membership an
"unlawful employment practice."67 A disparate treatment claim requires that at
least one party associated with the employer68 have acted with intent, and in
individual suits the locus of the requisite intent is clear. An employer that had
discriminatory policies is directly liable for discriminatory outcomes. If a
plaintiff can prove job-related discriminatory conduct by a supervisor, the
entity is strictly vicariously liable. 69
Systemic suits raise more difficult culpability issues. These suits are
brought not under the basic provision barring unlawful practices but under the
prohibition against engaging in a "pattern or practice of resistance to the full
enjoyment of any of the rights secured by this subchapter." 70 The pattern or
practice provision is not freestanding. It protects rights secured by Title VII,
such as the basic prohibition of unlawful practices, and thus creates a nested
culpability requirement. The first requirement, which I will call stage 1
culpability, consists of the culpability needed to demonstrate a violation of
rights secured by the chapter. The second requirement, stage 2 culpability,
consists of whatever additional culpability requirement is imposed by the
pattern or practice provision on the entity itself.
In a classic systemic disparate treatment suit, proof of an entity-level policy
to discriminate would demonstrate an underlying unlawful practice of disparate
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (2006)
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-2 (2006).
68. Sometimes a client or independent contractor may have the requisite degree of association.
Zatz, supra note 16.
69. Cf Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775 (1998). Although addressed specifically to the problem of sexual harassment, the language of
these two major agency cases is general and suggests that the vicarious liability rule is not unique to
sexual harassment.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (2006). Although the text of this provision authorizes only the Attorney
General to bring a civil action, the Supreme Court has held that pattern or practice analysis also applies
to private class actions. Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 869 n.9 (1984)
("[T]he elements of a prima facie pattern-or-practice case are the same in a private class action."). The
rationale for this was never fully spelled out, but the pattern or practice provision would appear to
present an easy case for an implied private cause of action. See generally Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78-
85 (1975) (holding that a private cause of action was implied when the plaintiff was a member of a
protected class, legislative intent was to confer private cause, a private right would advance
congressional purpose, and state law was inadequate).
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treatment, satisfying stage 1 culpability. Since intent is the highest possible
culpability level and the entity itself discriminated intentionally, any stage 2
culpability requirement imposed by the pattern or practice provision would also
be met. However, in a structural systemic lawsuit, central management is
alleged not to have intentionally discriminated itself but to have facilitated
intentional discrimination by supervisors. Intentional discrimination by
supervisors meets the stage I requirement of intent in a systemic suit, and
would support liability in individual suits under the rule of strict vicarious
entity liability.
Individual litigation, however, would neither provide relief for the class as
a whole nor address the systemic causes of discrimination. A fundamental
unanswered question in systemic disparate treatment suits is whether
supervisorial intent satisfies not only the stage 1 culpability requirement but
also any stage 2 culpability requirement imposed at the entity level by the
pattern or practice provision. The entity might be liable only in cases of an
intentional entity level policy of discrimination; it might be strictly liable for
the acts of supervisors; or it might be liable if it acted negligently. As I argued
in Section I.C., policy considerations support negligence liability.7 1 Although
the culpability element of pattern or practice cases has never been closely
examined by the courts, the statute and case law provide a framework
consistent with a negligence approach.
The language of the pattern or practice requirement suggests that stage 2
culpability need not be the same as stage 1 culpability. Congress could have
simply granted the Attorney General the power to enforce violations of the
72
other provisions of Title VII, but it did not. Instead, it created a separate
cause of action, using distinct and vivid terminology: defendants are liable for
"a pattern or practice of resistance."
The term "resistance," which has received little if any attention in the case
law, suggests some culpability requirement in the pattern or practice provision
independent of the culpability needed to establish the relevant "rights secured"
by Title VII. The legislative history of Title VII indicates that the expression
"pattern or practice of resistance" "was not intended as a term of art, and the
words reflect only their usual meaning."73 In ordinary usage, "resistance"
implies an awareness of the consequences of one's action and is surely
inconsistent with the imposition of strict liability. At the same time, a
71. See supra Section I.C.
72. For example, the 1972 Amendments to Title Vll gave the EEOC the power to sue when
conciliation efforts had failed after a charge had been filed that an employer "has engaged in an
unlawful employment practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2006). The provision grants the EEOC the
right to "bring a civil action" in court, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2006), and thus simply provides
enforcement power for the central prohibition on unlawful employment practices rather than creating a
new right, as does the "pattern or practice of resistane provision," 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (2006).
73. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.16 (1977) (citing 110 Cong. Rec.
14270 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey)).
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requirement of "resistance" covers a range of possible attitudes towards the
thing resisted. People may resist change because they affirmatively oppose the
long-term consequences of change or because they simply do not want to be
bothered with the inconvenience that change requires. Thus, "resistance" does
not necessarily imply an intent to engage in an unlawful practice, and would
seem to include conduct such as the knowing failure to remove impediments to
the plaintiffs' enjoyment of a protected right.74 That "resistance" is a lower
standard than intent is corroborated by the Supreme Court's only comment on
the meaning of the pattern or practice requirement,75 which stated that a
"pattern or practice" meant that "discrimination was the company's standard
,76
operating procedure-the regular rather than the unusual practice." This
explication seems to focus on the frequency of the conduct and though
consistent with some culpability requirement does not suggest a stringent one.
The legislative history of Title VII similarly suggests a focus on frequency
rather than culpability:
[A] pattern or practice would be present only where the denial of rights
consists of something more than an isolated, sporadic incident, but is
repeated, routine, or of a generalized nature . . . The point is that
single, insignificant, isolated acts of discrimination by a single
business would not justify a finding of a pattern or practice ....
To require negligence in systemic cases instead of the strict vicarious
liability of individual suits accords with the different policies and proof patterns
in the two types of suits. To establish the existence of discrimination, an
individual plaintiff must satisfy stringent proof requirements.7 8 The proof
74. An intermediate level of fault is also consistent with the policy recommendations of many
observers. See Bagenstos, supra note 25; Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 18;
Green, Structural Approach, supra note 25; Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking, supra note 18; Krieger,
supra note 17; Oppenheimer, supra note 17; Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, supra
note 25; Sullivan, supra note 25; Verkerkc,supra note 25; Zatz, supra note 16. In his insightful analysis
of the potential role of notice-based negligence liability in discrimination cases, Professor Verkerke
argues that, from a policy perspective, individual liability should be based on notice while systemic
liability should be strict. Verkerke, supra note 25. His argument, however, is addressed to discrimination
policy generally rather than to the specific problems raised by delegated discretion. As applied to
delegated discretion, his arguments may support notice-based negligence rather than vicarious liability
for individual cases, but probably do not undermine the case for notice liability in systemic cases.
75. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336. The Court's only other opinions on the substantive requirements
for systemic liability do not address problems of statutory construction. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S.
385 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1971). Professor Selmi has noted the
Court's puzzling failure to provide more guidance on systemic cases. Michael Selmi, Theorizing
Systemic Disparate Treatment Law After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32 BERKELEY J. oF EMP. & LAB. L.
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 479-80).
76. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336.
77. Id. at 336 n. 16 (citing 110 Cong. Rec. 14270 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey)).
78. The Supreme Court initially set out these proof patterns in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). The
subsequent development of these proof patterns satisfies no one:
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required in systemic class actions, however, is inevitably less definitive at least
in the liability phase. The proof pattern for such systemic cases was first set
down in Teamsters v. United States. In the initial liability phase, the court
determines whether the defendant has engaged in an unlawful pattern or
practice using statistical evidence supplemented with illustrative examples of
discriminatory conduct. In the second or remedies phase, the court determines
collective remedies, primarily injunctive, for the class and also the remedies,
typically monetary, specific to each plaintiff. The class-wide finding of
discrimination creates a presumption in favor of each plaintiff, but the
defendant is permitted to try to establish that it would have made the
employment decision in question even absent the discriminatory practice.79
Thus, the primary finding of a pattern or practice requires no compelling proof
that the defendant discriminated in any particular case.80 A plaintiff who has
met the demanding standards of individual proof receives the benefit of strict
liability while one who has made the somewhat less conclusive showing of a
pattern or practice must also demonstrate "resistance," which may include
failure to act under appropriate circumstances. The term "resistance" will
typically include the failure to exercise due care with actual notice; whether it
should include inaction without actual notice is less clear, and might best be
resolved in concrete factual settings.
An explicit recognition that the pattern or practice provision provides for
an intermediate level of fault such as negligence would constitute new law. Yet
it would be an extension grounded both in the statutory text and in the policy
considerations relevant to class litigation.
b) Commonality in Pattern or Practice Claims
Since a class action cannot "abridge, enlarge or modify" preexisting
rights,8 ' the propriety of class certification in a structural case depends on
rights provided by Title VII. A private Title VII class action can proceed under
either of two distinct theories: an aggregation of individual employment claims
under the central prohibition of unlawful practices or an implied private cause
of action under the pattern or practice provision. 82
The . . . jurisprudence has been a quagmire that defies characterization despite the valiant
efforts of various courts and commentators. Within circuits, and often within opinions,
different approaches are conflated, mixing burden of persuasion with evidentiary standards,
confusing burden of ultimate persuasion with the burden to establish an affirmative defense,
and declining to acknowledge the role of circumstantial evidence.
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 299 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002), affd, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
79. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 362.
80. For this reason, a negligence-based pattern or practice theory that meets Rule 23(a) may satisfy
Rule 23(b) only for collective rather than individual remedies, See infra Subsection II.C.2.
81. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006); see also Nagareda, Preexistence Principle, supra note 57, at 189-98.
82. The choice between a "case-aggregation model" and the "litigating-group model" is not unique
to Title VII cases. See Bone, supra note 63, at 106-07.
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Private class actions must meet the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 83 including, in Rule 23(a)(2), a threshold requirement
that the suit present "questions of law or fact common to the class." An
aggregation model has one key advantage to plaintiffs, the strict liability that
attaches to individual claims. However, in a case challenging delegated
discretion, an aggregation model is unlikely to satisfy the commonality
requirement. Each employee's claim would involve a distinct set of employee
qualifications and supervisorial actions. Because of Title VII's complex proof
doctrines, each employee's case might well raise factual and legal issues with
little if any common nexus. A corporate policy of delegated discretion as such
will play only a minor evidentiary role in each case, and any attempt to elevate
that role to create a common question could run afoul of requirement that Rule
23 not "abridge, enlarge or modify" preexisting rights of either party.
In contrast, a pattern or practice suit presents an obvious common question,
the existence of an entity-wide pattern or practice of discrimination. A classic
pattern or practice suit alleges an entity-level policy of intentional
discrimination, and such a policy would meet both the requirement of a pattern
or practice and the culpability requirement implied by the term "resistance." A
structural case, however, is more complicated. A policy of delegated discretion
may constitute a pattern or practice sufficient to present a common question but
will not suffice to establish liability without some additional showing of
culpability constituting "resistance." By choosing a collective rather than an
aggregated case approach, plaintiffs can more easily show a common question,
but the price of easier commonality is the loss of automatic strict liability.
To say that a company's policy of allowing discretion may provide a
common question of negligence liability is not to say that every class that
asserts such a claim should be certified. As the new certification jurisprudence
suggests, courts must make some determination that the plaintiffs can provide
evidence sufficient to provide a jury a reasonable basis for finding their favor,
and the putative class must make some showing of disparate outcomes and
negligence. Even given such a showing, Rule 23 requires a court to determine
how to structure the action by defining classes and subclasses according to the
issues that bind them together.84 Liability under any Title VII theory requires
evidence of harm,85 and even a uniform policy of delegated discretion may
83. This requirement was long accepted as obvious by lower courts and first discussed at length in
General Telephone Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1981). See George Rutherglen, Title VII
Class Actions, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 688 (1979) [hereinafter Rutherglen, Title VII Class Actions].
84. FED. R. Ctv. P. 23(c)(1)(B), (c)(4).
85. This determination begins with a difficult statistical analysis whose basic methodology is
common to both disparate treatment and disparate impact theories. Determining the proper level of
aggregation over regions and jobs is a difficult problem for which there is no mathematically clean
solution. Too small a unit of aggregation can make almost any variable statistically insignificant. Too
large a unit of aggregation can cause false correlations driven by differences between individuals that
have been lost in the aggregation process. See Daniel S. Klein, Bridging the Falcon Gap: Do Claims of
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have different effects on different groups of employees. Structural
discrimination is a consequence of attitudes prevailing among supervisors, and
these may differ between geographic regions and job types.86 A company's
response may be negligent towards some subclasses but not towards others.87
Many possible combinations of classes and subclasses may be appropriate for
the issues of notice, harm, and causation, and some employees in the protected
group may be excluded from the action altogether. 88
Some observers have expressed concern that forcing plaintiffs to litigate
narrow claims and classes will make structural suits economically infeasible:
without larger stakes, attorneys will not be able to take such inherently risky
cases. However, attomeys acting purely from self-interest might well choose to
litigate first the claim or the subclass that presents the strongest case for
certification. Once certification has been granted even on a single claim or to a
small class, defendants are often eager to expand the scope of the class and
claims during settlement negotiations in order to put the matter to rest.
2. Disparate Impact
a) Individual Claims: Negligence or Strict Liability?
Disparate impact theory, first developed by the Supreme Court in 1971 in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,8 allows plaintiffs to challenge a policy or practice
because of its disparate effect on the protected class. However, the employer is
not liable if the practice is sufficiently job-related.
The details of the job-relatedness test have changed over the years. Under
Griggs, the employer had the burden of proving that the practice in question
was a "business necessity" 90 that had a "manifest relationship" 9' to the
contested job. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,92 the Court gave plaintiffs the
opportunity to respond to a showing of business necessity with proof that
alternative selection devices could "serve the employer's legitimate interest"
with less discriminatory impact.93 In the late 1980s, the Court raised the
Subjective Decisionmaking in Employment Discrimination Class Actions Satisfy the Rule 23(a)
Commonality and Typicality Requirements?, 25 REV. LITIG. 131, 165-71 (2006).
86. Supervisors may tend to discriminate in promotion to higher level jobs while making relatively
fair decisions in lower level jobs. Discretion might well be exercised in a discriminatory manner in
male-typed jobs but not in female-typed jobs. Weiss, Annoyingly Indeterminate, supra note 16, at 141
(scx-typed jobs).
87. In some circumstances notice as to one group should prompt investigation as to others.
However, problems may not be apparent after investigation.
88. The issues in the text concern only whether the common question requirement of 23(a) are
satisfied. Further complications are introduced by Rule 23(b). See infra Subsection II.C.2.
89. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
90. Id. at 431.
91. Id. at 432.
92. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
93. Id. at 425.
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plaintiffs' burden in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust94 and Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio.95 The burden of proof on job-relatedness was shifted to
the plaintiff,96 and the term "necessity" was dropped in favor of the less
demanding requirement that "the challenged practice serve[], in a significant
way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer." 97 Plaintiffs were also
required to identify the challenged employment practices with specificity. 98
Defendants were required to accept the alternative procedure proposed by
plaintiffs only if it was "equally effective," a standard which was to include
considerations of the cost of the practice. 99 The Civil Rights Act of 1991
codified the rules for proving disparate impact, restoring the term "business
necessity" and moving the burden of proof of job-relatedness back to the
defendant, 0 0 but retaining with a limited exception the requirement that
plaintiff prove causation for each specific practice.' 0' Any alternative practice
proposed by plaintiffs was to be evaluated by the more pro-plaintiff pre- Wards
Cove standard. 0 2
Disparate impact imposes a kind of strict liability to the extent that it
allows recovery whenever the composition of the defendant's workforce
departs from that of the relevant labor market. 03 However, the business
necessity defense adds some requirement of fault:104 it may be seen as
imposing liability if the employer fails to take reasonable steps to ensure that
the practice is job-related and thus to prevent or at least reduce its
discriminatory effects.
The exact location of disparate impact doctrine on the continuum of fault
has varied with the job-relatedness defense. Standard negligence doctrine
places on the plaintiff the duty of showing that the defendant did not take due
care. Disparate impact might resemble a negligence rule if, as under Watson
and Wards Cove, the burden of proving lack of job-relatedness were on the
plaintiff. However, the negligence standard of due care has no exact parallel in
the terms used in various cases to define job-relatedness. The Griggs and now
statutory standard of "business necessity" does not balance costs and benefits
and thus seems clearly higher than due care. The Wards Cove requirement,
rejected by Congress, that a practice serve "in a significant way ... legitimate
employment goals"' 0 5 sounds somewhat lower than due care though it is vague
94. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
95. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
96. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 660-61; Watson, 487 U.S. at 997-98.
97. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
98. Watson, 487 U.S. at 994.
99. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 661; see also Watson, 487 U.S. at 998.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-2(k)(I)(B)(i) (2006).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-2(k)(1)(A)(ii), (C) (2006).
103. Oppenheimer, supra note 17, at 920-21.
104. Id. at 930.
105. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989).
2012] 143
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
enough that it might be interpreted to impose a due care standard that weighed
costs against benefits.
Similarly, the rules for identifying alternative practices do not track due
care in any straightforward way. The Wards Cove requirement of equal
effectiveness clearly fails to balance benefits against costs. The statutory
standard from Albemarle that the proposed practice "serve the employer's
legitimate interest" resembles the Wards Cove job-relatedness test: it neither
clearly incorporates nor clearly precludes the cost-benefit considerations that
are central to due care.
Under current statutory rules, the culpability requirement of disparate
impact doctrine is relatively close but not equivalent to strict liability. In
practice, however, courts have been extremely reluctant to impose liability in
disparate impact cases,106 perhaps because of distaste for what they regard as
de facto strict liability. Congress seems to have done plaintiffs no favor by
easing their burdens in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. By providing rules too far
from what judges and juries will enforce, they may have reduced the level of
disparate impact liability below what it would have been under less
superficially pro-plaintiff rules. Ultimately, a statutory problem demands a
statutory solution, but in the meantime plaintiffs have a kind of self-help
remedy. Although current statutory rules do not require that they do so,
plaintiffs can cater to judges' and juries' moral intuitions by acting as if they
bear the burden of proof on job-relatedness, or alternatively, by assuming that
the defendant will meet this burden so that to prevail they must provide an
alternative practice. o0 Either approach will require that they provide detailed
evidence of the deficiencies of the employers' current practices and the
feasibility of alternative practices. If the tests for job-relatedness and alternative
practices are moved toward a negligence standard, there may be little practical
difference between these approaches: if a practice meets a due care standard of
job-relatedness, then there is unlikely to be an alternative practice that can
reduce disparate impact in a cost-effective way.
b) Commonality in Subjective Practice Disparate Impact Claims
The commonality required by Rule 23(a) is far easier to establish under a
disparate impact theory than under a disparate treatment theory. A disparate
impact theory, by its very nature, raises the question of how a practice affects
an entire protected group and whether the practice as applied to the whole
group is job-related. In the words of one commentator, disparate impact is
106. Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, supra note 25, at 738.
107. This argument is developed in more detail in Weiss, Misplaced Modesty, supra note 37.
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"inherently a class-based theory." 08 In the paradigmatic disparate impact suit
challenging a written test, the existence of a common question is so obvious
that it typically receives no attention. Whether disparate impact claims are
aggregated individual suits or pattern or practice claims is seldom if ever
discussed. Indeed, they seem to be almost a third intrinsically collective claim:
courts and commentators distinguish between "pattern-or-practice disparate
treatment claims" and "disparate impact" claims109 and note that individual
plaintiffs often do not even think of asserting a disparate impact claim. 110
That disparate impact has a strongly collective character does not imply
that all putative disparate impact classes deserve certification. One threshold
issue is whether the challenged conduct constitutes a "practice."II This issue
has been raised in a number of settings,112 but has been most important in
delegated discretion cases. Courts for many years split over the availability of
disparate impact theory for subjective personnel practices." 3 In 1988, the
landmark Supreme Court case Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust held that the
delegation of subjective decision-making power to supervisors may be an
"unlawful employment practice" under a disparate impact theory if the
* 114discretion is exercised in a discriminatory manner.
Watson itself was an individual claim 15 and the opinion did not address
the availability of the class certification in subjective practice cases. However,
once Watson established that subjective evaluation could be a "practice," the
basic logic of commonality applies: any disparate impact challenge to a
108. Elaine W. Shoben, Disparate Impact Theory in Employment Discrimination: What's Griggs
Still Good For? What Not?, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 597, 598 (2003); see also Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg.,
370 F.3d 565, 576 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that commonality is easier to establish in disparate impact
cases and disparate impact analysis is more commonly used in class actions than in individual claims);
Sullivan, supra note 25, at 982.
109. See, e.g., Robinson v. Mctro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 160 (2001); see also
Bacon, 370 F.3d at 472-73.
110. Sullivan, supra note 25, at 982.
111. Conceivably, certain behavior might constitute a "practice" for purposes of disparate impact
doctrine but not for purposes of the pattern or practice provision. However, this seems unlikely to be of
much importance since the pattern or practice provision does not seem to have the significance in
disparate impact cases that it does in disparate treatment cases.
112. See, e.g., EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding
word-of-mouth recruiting was not a "practice"). The most common reason that the requirement of a
"practice" is not met is that the plaintiff fails to identify the supposed practice with adequate specificity.
See, e.g., United Ass'n of Black Landscapers v. City of Milwaukee, 916 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1990);
Kelber v. Forest Elec. Corp., 799 F. Supp. 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Guntur v. Union Coll., 57 Fair Emp.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 925 (N.D.N.Y. 1991).
113. The principal early case rejecting the application of disparate impact theory to subjective
practices is Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982). The earliest case to
apply disparate impact theory to subjective judgments is Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348
(5th Cir. 1972). Note that several circuits contained cases taking inconsistent positions on this issue. For
a prescient discussion of the early case law and the underlying issues, see Alfred W. Blumroscn, The
Legacy ofGriggs: Social Progress and Subjective Judgments, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REv. I (1987).
114. 487U.S.977(1971).
115. The individual claim was left over after a class challenge was dismissed for lack of
commonality. Id. at 983.
2012] 145
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
"practice" raises the common questions of the effect of the practice on the
entire protected group and the job-relatedness of the practice. Since individual
employees of a firm can each challenge a particular subjective practice under
Watson, a group of such individuals challenging the same practice necessarily
have in common the questions of impact and job-relatedness under an
aggregation model of class litigation." 6 In contrast to a disparate treatment
claim, the employer faces primary, not vicarious, liability for a personnel policy
deliberately chosen at the entity level.' 7
Under Watson, almost any use of subjective criteria can in theory be
challenged by both an individual and by some class. However, this is a far cry
from saying that any challenge to subjective criteria deserves certification.
Plaintiffs must make some preliminary showing of harm to a class. Even given
such evidence, the harm may not be uniform across all protected group
members subject to the practice, and division into subclasses may be
appropriate. And even if a company has an entirely uniform policy of
delegating discretion, the issues of job-relatedness and alternative practices
may differ between different classes of workers. A high degree of subjectivity
may be unavoidable in certain jobs but not others. The high school degree
challenged in the original disparate impact case, Griggs,'"9 might not have
been a business necessity for manual labor, but would surely have been
acceptable for a position as a bookkeeper or an engineer. These considerable
hurdles for plaintiffs to clear are of great practical importance but in no way
undermine the basic principle that Watson implies-the theoretical possibility
of a common issue satisfying the 23(a) requirements for a class challenge to
subjective practices. 120
116. Such a class may face other obstacles to certification, such as whether the common questions
predominate over the individual ones.
117. Disparate treatment claims based on subjective practices are challenges to the outcomes of
employment practices, not to the practices themselves. On an aggregation theory, the employer has
taken no action common to the class: it faces vicarious liability for the acts of individual supervisors,
and thus the aggregated claims of many individuals may have little in common.
118. One recurring problem is the difficulty of proving common impact. Compare Brown v. Nucor
Corp., 576 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1720 (2010) (finding commonality based on
extremely convincing facts) with Carpenter v. Boeing Co., No. 02-1019-WEB, 2004 WL 2661691, at *4
(D. Kan. Feb. 24, 2004), aff'd, 456 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2006) (deccrtifying the overall class and some
subclasses where statistical evidence indicated only "pockets" of discrimination).
119. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
120. See Klein, supra note 85. Klein analyzes in detail the confusion that has been created in the
case law by footnote 15 of General Telephone Co. ofthe Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 (1981).
Falcon invalidated the Fifth Circuit's across-the-board rule which permitted "an employee complaining
of one employment practice to represent another complaining of another practice, if the plaintiff and the
members of the class suffer from essentially the same injury." Falcon v. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw., 626 F.2d
369, 375 (5th Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court held in Falcon, quite reasonably, that all class members
must complain of a single practice and present significant evidence of that practice. In footnote 15, the
Court provided examples of how plaintiffs could satisfy commonality, including evidence of biased
testing procedures and "significant proof that an employer operated under a general policy of
discrimination . . . such as through entirely subjective decisionmaking processes." Falcon, 457 U.S. at
159. Subsequent courts have placed enormous weight on this aside, even though the questions of how
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C. Remedies
In addition to satisfying all provisions of Rule 23(a), class actions must fall
into one of the three types described by Rule 23(b). The availability of each
type of certification is intertwined with the nature of the relief requested. Thus,
to understand what is at stake in Rule 23(b) issues, this Section will examine
the appropriate remedies in structural cases, arguing that both case law and
policy place significant restrictions on the appropriate remedies for structural
harms.
1. Remedies under Title VII
The original Civil Rights Act of 1964 provided for injunctive relief and
limited monetary damages to back pay,121 though it also provided for attorney's
fees.122 This unusual set of remedies resulted from an odd mix of ad hoc
compromise and conscious policy. Although the legislative history of the Act is
generally agreed to be "chaotic,"l23 certain themes emerge. Congress
understood that centuries of ingrained attitudes could not be undone with the
stroke of a pen nor even with sustained litigation. Voluntary compliance (or at
least relatively voluntary compliance) was essential. The stick of liability
should be large enough to induce employers to begin the process of change but
not so large as to make them fear that any admission of wrongdoing might
subject them to enormous monetary damages. Thus, the statute emphasized
practices were defined or whether delegated discretion constituted a practice were never certified or
argued and even though Falcon was decided before Watson, which did discuss extensively the proper
treatment of subjective practices. As Klein notes, lower courts have tended to give footnote 15 one of
two extreme interpretations. Some conclude that any entirely subjective process is automatically entitled
to certification while others have concluded that only entirely subjective practices satisfy commonality.
Klein, supra note 855, at 148-51. Klein observes that neither reading makes sense either as a reading of
Falcon or as a policy matter and neither can easily be squared with Watson. Instead, the plaintiff must
isolate the subjective components of the employer's practice and demonstrate causation with specificity,
although these requirements erect no conceptual bar to challenging a subjective practice even if that
practice is only one of several criteria used to evaluate employees. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,
487 U.S. at 994-95.
121. The original Act provided that a court that finds an unlawful employment practice:
may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to,
reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without [up to two years of] back pay . . . or
any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2006). That "other equitable relief' did not include any monetary damages
other than the stipulated two years back pay was soon widely agreed on, Van Hoomissen v. Xerox
Corp., 368 F. Supp. 829, 835-38 (N.D. Cal 1973), affd, 497 F. 2d 180 (9th Cir. 1974), but was not
authoritatively established until after monetary remedies were broadened. Landgrafv. USI Film Prods.,
511 U.S. 244 (1994).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2006).
123. Note, Discrimination in Employment and in Housing: Private Enforcement Provisions of the
Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, 82 HARV. L. REV. 834, 863 (1969).
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remediation even at the expense of compensation, and monetary damages were
limited. 124
The Act further attempted to discourage confrontation by providing that all
complaints under the Act were to be filed initially with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which was to "endeavor to eliminate any
such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion."1 25 As Congress considered what should happen
if conciliation failed, the element of political bargaining began to inform the
debate. Some Senators were concerned about excessively zealous enforcement
by the EEOC, and felt the policies of the Act would be best accomplished
through suits by private parties in the federal courts. Since minimal damage
awards might make private actions economically infeasible, attorneys' fees
were made available. 126
As the original Act began to accomplish its mission, Congress decided that
more extensive remedies were appropriate, at least in the case of intentional
discrimination.' 27 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 authorized awards of
compensatory and punitive damages in disparate treatment cases128 and, as
constitutionally required,129 provided the right to a jury trial in cases where
such damages were requested.130 However, the same policy concerns that
support negligence liability in cases of structural discrimination suggest that the
appropriate remedies are more akin to those of the 1964 Act, which promoted
reform at the partial expense of compensation, than to those of the 1991 Act
which provided extensive compensation.
124.
According to the House Report on the Bill, "[tihe purpose of this title is to eliminate, through
the utilization of formal and informal remedial procedures, discrimination in employment"
(House Report No. 914, 1964 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News 2401). Additional
members of the House Committee which wrote that Report referred to the Commission, the
administrative body which would in large part carry out the purpose of the Title, as an
agency which would work in a corrective, not a punitive, manner: "It must ... be stressed
that the Commission must confine its activities to correcting abuse, not promoting equality
with mathematical certainty . . . Its primary task is to make certain that the channels of
employment are open to persons regardless of their race" (Id. at 2516).
Van Hoomissen, 368 F. Supp. at 836 (alteration in original).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-5(b) (2006).
126. Rutherglen, Title VII Class Actions, supra note 83, at 692-94; Francis J. Vaas, Title VIL:
Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 431, 453-54 (1965); see also Christiansburg
Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978) (explaining importance of private attorneys general under
Title VII); cf Newman v. Piggic Park Enter., 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (explaining the importance of private
attorneys general under Title II, which provides only injunctive relief).
127. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 550 (1999) (Stevens, J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("[O1ne could reasonably believe, as Congress did, that as our national resolve against
employment discrimination hardens, deliberate violations of Title VII and the ADA become increasingly
blameworthy and more properly the subject of 'societal condemnation.' (citation omitted)).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2006).
129. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (2006). Jury trials were not available for claims for back pay under the
original Act, whose remedies were regarded as equitable in nature.
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The remedies scheme of the 1964 Act had three interrelated components:
structural remedies, limited damages, and attorney's fees. Injunctive relief is
central to the resolution of structural cases, as it was to the early cases under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Crafting such relief, however, is a difficult task,
perhaps more difficult than in the early cases. Plaintiffs must make a detailed
request, well-supported by expert testimony, for specific injunctive relief in the
form of modified employment practices. Such a request serves a number of
critical purposes. First, the existence of a feasible alternative is essential to a
negligence theory. Few courts, and surely not the current Supreme Court, will
be willing to impose liability on a defendant which had no realistic alternative
to the challenged discriminatory structures. Second, discussion of the details of
structural reforms now tends to occur, if at all, after certification and during
settlement, frustrating several goals of Title VII. Even observers sympathetic to
structural cases have expressed concern about the value of personnel policies
instituted as a result of settlement negotiations. These negotiations receive little
judicial oversight; employees, the true stakeholders, often play little or no role;
and the process as a whole may end up primarily benefiting attorneys and
consultants.131 Even if useful reforms are agreed on, the value of these changes
is limited to the single case that is settled. Few if any reported opinions
examine in any detail which employment practices will protect an employer
against Title VII liability, leaving employers with little guidance about their
statutory obligations and undermining the long-term goal of the statute, which
is prevention and reform. A principal benefit of expanded merits review during
class certification would be to provide a more complete body of law on these
obligations. Finally, the delineation of specific injunctive remedies goes to the
fundamental credibility of the case. The absence of a serious proposal for
structural reform casts raises doubt about whether plaintiffs' class lawyers are
acting as private attorneys general or merely pursuing cases for their own
financial gain.
Many scholars have questioned whether the full range of damages should
be available in structural cases. Most obviously, punitive damages are
inappropriate.132 Judicial and public opinion do not strongly support liability in
structural cases,133 and imposing punitive damages risks destroying the support
that does exist. Even with more widespread support, heavy penalties would not
clearly serve the fundamental remedial goal of Title VII. Considerable
uncertainty exists about the best means of preventing structural discrimination,
and the objective of Title VII should be to encourage cooperation and
131. Bagenstos, supra note 25, at 28-34; Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature
of Class Action Employment Discrimination Litigation and its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1324-31
(2003) [hereinafter Selmi, Price ofDiscrimination].
132. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 17, at 1243-44; Oppenheimer, supra note 17, at 972.
133. See supra Section I.C.
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experimentation by employers.134 The threat of severe sanctions may
undermine this cooperation by deterring potentially incriminating self-policing
and settlement negotiations.' 35
These concerns strongly militate against the imposition of punitive
damages in structural cases and indeed existing law all but precludes punitive
damages in cases of negligence-based vicarious liability. The Civil Rights Act
of 1991 authorized punitive damages where the defendant acted "with malice
or with reckless indifference."' 36 Following standard common law principles,
the Supreme Court in Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n has held that punitive
damages under Title VII requires an "element of conscious wrongdoing" and
placed strict limits on the availability of punitive damages for vicarious
wrongdoing.137 A structural plaintiff would need to show that individual
supervisors acted with the requisite "element of conscious wrongdoing," that is,
"with malice or with reckless indifference." In addition, the corporate
defendant would need to meet the stringent culpability standards outlined in
Kolstad. Any case in which these requirements are met is best characterized as
a one of traditional discrimination, not one in which elusive unconscious bias is
facilitated by workplace structures.' 38
The proper scope of individual compensatory damages in structural cases
presents a more difficult problem. Like punitive damages, full compensatory
damages may discourage settlement. The two years' back pay allowed by the
original 1964 Act is not a magic number, but several scholars have concluded
that it represents a reasonable compromise between the goals of remediation
and compensation in structural cases.139 Limitation of compensatory damages,
some might argue, may inhibit class counsel from bringing the private suits for
injunctive relief that are central to the enforcement of Title VII. Of course,
Title VII provides for statutory attorney's fees, but perhaps fee awards alone do
not compensate attorneys for the risk of not prevailing. Conversely, however,
contingency damages may result in windfalls, and can create troubling conflicts
of interest for class counsel: the possibility of large awards may focus counsel's
efforts on monetary awards rather than on structural remedies and the fees
134. See supra Subsection I.C.
135. Mitchell, supra note 36, at 115.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a(b)(1) (2006).
137. 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
138. Brown v. Nucor Corp., 576 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2009), presents an apparent exception, but
primarily because the outrageous racial hostility displayed made it a traditional rather than a true
structural case. The Nucor plaintiffs may have made a strategic mistake by emphasizing the role of
structural factors such as subjective decision-making. Although a class was ultimately certified by the
Fourth Circuit, certification was initially denied by the district court, Brown v. Nucor Corp., 2:04-
22005-CWH, 2007 WL 2284581 (D.S.C. 2007), the Fourth Circuit panel was divided, Nucor, 576 F.3d
149, and certification was denied in a companion case in the Eighth Circuit, Bennett v. Nucor Corp., 656
F.3d 802 (8th Cir. 2011).
139. Krieger, supra note 17, at 1243.
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themselves may come out of the class recovery. 140 Contingency fees cannot
substitute for careful calculation of attorney's fees and do not provide a
rationale for extending compensatory damages. Even if contingency fees were
desirable on policy grounds, the Supreme Court has held that contingency
adjustments are not permitted to statutory fee awards,141 and lower courts
should discontinue the practice of allowing settlements that evade this
principle.142
2. Remedies under Rule 23(b)
Virtually all Title VII class actions have proceeded under either Rule
23(b)(2) or (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 23(b)(2)
applies when "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class," so that the appropriate remedy
would be injunctive or declaratory relief "with respect to the class as a
whole." 43 A (b)(3) action is appropriate when there are differences in the
claims of class members but common issues of law or fact "predominate" over
individual questions and a class action is superior to other approaches. 144
Significantly different procedures apply to 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) cases. Cases
under 23(b)(3) are thought to present a far greater chance of prejudice to the
interests of class members who do not actively participate in the suit, and thus
the court must make extensive efforts to notify all possible class members of
the suit and its potential effect on their rights.145 Moreover, members of a
potential class under (b)(3) have the right to opt out of the suit, making any
judgment not binding on them.
A class seeking only injunctive relief is clearly eligible for certification
under 23(b)(2), but the difficult question both in Title VII cases and elsewhere
is whether such classes could also obtain any monetary relief. Attorney's fees
incurred in the pursuit of class-wide injunctive relief have no individualized
component, and the policies of Rule 23(b) present no reason for their exclusion.
However, individual relief such as back-pay and other compensatory damages
raise more serious problems. Under Teamsters, these individual damages are
calculated not based on any collective formula but in individual proceedings,
140. See Selmi, Price ofDiscrimination, supra note 13 1, at 1275-76.
141. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992) (involving a different statute but using
reasoning applicable to all federal attorney's fee provisions).
142. Selmi, Price ofDiscrimination, supra note 131, at 1328-29.
143. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
144. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
145. The opposite argument can be made, however. Since the injunctive relief will apply
indivisibly to all class members, perhaps notice is more important in 23(b)(2) cases.
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thus raising questions about the appropriateness of the class action form.146
Prior to the 1991 amendments, most courts concluded that individually
calculated back pay was incidental to the declaratory and injunctive relief being
sought and allowed the action under 23(b)(2).
The status of individual damages under 23(b)(2) became more important
after the Civil Rights Act of 1991 raised the monetary stakes by authorizing
awards of compensatory and punitive damages in disparate treatment cases.147
Almost all courts continued to permit certification under 23(b)(2) of claims
whose monetary damage claims were limited to back pay. 148 However, the
Supreme Court cast some doubt on these cases by holding in a non-Title VII
case that 23(b)(2) certification was available only when any damages requested
were incidental.149 Subsequent courts split over the proper treatment of other
compensatory damages. Some granted 23(b)(2) certification to such classes
seeking compensatory or punitive damages.150 The most restrictive position
was taken by the Fifth Circuit, which held in Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp.
that the compensatory and punitive damages allowed by the 1991 Act and the
corresponding extensive individualized determinations precluded class
certification under both 23(b)(2) and (b)(3).'"' The Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Wal-Mart in part to resolve the division among lower courts on
these issues. 152
146. Under Teamsters, these individual damages are calculated in special individual proceedings
through a procedure that modifies the rules applicable to individual trials. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 371-78 (1977).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2006).
148. See, e.g., Reeb v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., 435 F.3d 639, 646-51 (6th Cir. 2006);
Murray v. Auslander, 244 F.3d 807, 812 (11th Cir. 2001); Lemon v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs
Local No. 139, 216 F.3d 577, 580-81 (7th Cir. 2000); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402,
415-16 (5th Cir. 1998). But see Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 490 F.2d
636 (7th Cir. 1973); Smith v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1606 (S.D.N.Y.
1974). See generally LEX K. LARSON, 4-81 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 81.07 (2d ed. 1994)
(summarizing cases in which courts permit certification under Rule 23(b)).
149. Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 121 (1994) (per curiam).
150. In Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147 (2001), the Second Circuit held
that the availability of 23(b)(2) class certification in claims seeking non-incidental monetary relief
should depend on "the relative importance of the remedies sought, given all of the facts and
circumstances of the case." Id. at 160. Certification under 23(b)(2) was appropriate if reasonable
plaintiffs would have brought the suit to obtain injunctive relief even without the possibility of monetary
damages. See also Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 949-50 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting incidental damages
distinction in favor of facts and circumstances test).
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010)
provided a different approach, suggesting the availability of 23(b)(2) certification should depend on the
balancing of a long list of factors including whether the claim for monetary relief "determines the key
procedures that will be used . . . introduces new and significant legal and factual issues . . . requires
individualized hearings, and .. . raise[s] particular due process and manageability concerns." Id. at 617.
151. Allison, 151 F.3d at 416-20. The Allison approach was followed by Reeb, 435 F.3d at 646-51,
Murray, 244 F.3d at 812, and Lemon, 216 F.3d at 580-81.
152. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 795 (2010).
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III. THE WAL-MART LITIGATION
Having argued that the Wal-Mart plaintiffs could have used existing Title
VII and class certification doctrine to craft a negligence theory of liability, I
now turn in Part III to a closer examination of the plaintiffs' missed
opportunities to do so.
A. Evidence
Plaintiffs central theme throughout the Wal-Mart litigation' 53 was Wal-
Mart's subjective and unstructured personnel practices:
Few objective requirements or qualifications for specific store
assignments, promotions, or raises exist. Salaries are supposed to
conform to general company guidelines, but store management has
substantial discretion in setting salary levels within salary ranges for
each employee. Salaries are also adjusted based on performance
reviews, which are largely based on subjective judgments of
performance.154
Plaintiffs also noted that Wal-Mart required as a condition of promotion to
store manager that "employees be willing to relocate" even to significantly
distant stores, and in practice required "frequent and substantial relocations of
its managers."155 The disadvantage that this created for women had been
frequently noted, even by Sam Walton himself.156
The plaintiffs produced statistical evidence that female employees at all
levels were paid less than comparable male employees.' 5 7 Their analysis
further suggested that women were less likely to be promoted than men and
that the proportion of women decreased with each step up the hierarchy:
Women comprised 72% of the hourly sales employees,'ss but less than 10% of
all store managers and 4% of all district managers.159 Wal-Mart's rate of
153. The Wal-Mart litigation took place over a ten-year period, and the evidence stressed by the
plaintiffs varied among the filings, motions and briefs introduced at different stages. In this Part, I
summarize the evidence, whenever presented, that might have most helped plaintiffs.
154. Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint 1 23, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137
(N.D. Cal. 2004) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ), aff'd, 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2541
(2011).
155. Id.'I29k.
156. In 1992, shortly before he passed away, Walton said:
Maybe that was necessary back in the old days, and maybe it was more rigid than it needed
to be. . . . [T]he old way really put good smart women at a disadvantage in -our company
because at that time they weren't as free to pick up and move as many men were. Now I've
seen the light on the opportunities that we missed out on with women.
SAM WALTON & JOHN HUEY, MADE IN AMERICA 217-18 (1992).
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promotion of women was far lower than that of its competitorsl 60 and not
typical of the retail industry, in which women hold 50% of management
jobs. 161
Plaintiffs introduced about 120 affidavits of individual experiences by store
employees. Many of these involved remarkably direct expressions of
discriminatory attitudes. Women were told that the position they had applied
for was unsuitable for a woman,162 that women should not pursue careers,163 or
that men should be paid more than women for the same work. 164 Plaintiffs also
introduced the expert testimony of Professor William Bielby that subjective
practices of the type used by Wal-Mart failed to constrain any bias in the
decision making of supervisors, and that such bias remained common. This
testimony both summarized general social science findings and applied that
social science to the particulars of Wal-Mart's practices.165
Wal-Mart management was repeatedly informed about a variety of
problems encountered by women throughout the organization. Central Wal-
Mart operations gathered extensive information about individual stores,
including payroll, labor and other employment data. 66 Internal Wal-Mart
studies using this data indicated that the percentage of women in management
at Wal-Mart lagged significantly behind other retailers. These reports were
presented to several high-level committees' 67 and, although management
evidently accepted these claims as true, they took no steps to remedy those
causes that were understood, such as the relocation policy, or to investigate
other possible causes. A group of executive women formed a committee to
convey their concerns about the problems faced by women, including their
exclusion from informal networking 68 and the choice of venues such as
160. Id.128.
161. Motion for Class Certification at 30, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D.
Cal. 2004) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ), aff'd, 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
162. Applicants were told "[y]ou're a girl, why do you want to be in Hardware?"; "[y]ou don't
want to work with guns"; and that the supervisor "needed a man in the [sporting goods department
manager] job." Id. at 6 n.5 (first two alterations in original).
163. One woman was told "you aren't part of the boy's club, and you should raise a family and stay
in the kitchen" instead of seeking advancement. Another was told to "resign as an assistant manager and
find a husband with whom she could settle down to relieve work-rclated stress." Another was told that
"women should be home barefoot and pregnant and women weren't qualified to be managers because
men had an extra rib." Id. at 16 n.9.
164. One woman was told that "[m]en need to be paid more than women because they have
families to support." When a single mother personnel manager asked why a male associate was
receiving a merit raise, a male assistant manager told her it was because he "has a family to support."
Another was told that a male assistant manager was making over $10,000 more than she was because he
"supports his wife and his two kids." One manager even said, "[y]ou don't have the right equipment...
you aren't male, so you can't expect to be paid the same." Id. at 17-18 n.10 (alterations in original).
165. Declaration of William T. Bielby, Ph.D. in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification, Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 222 F.R.D. 137 (No. C-01-2252 MJJ).
166. Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint, supra note 154,121.
167. Motion for Class Certification, supra note 161, at 31-32.
168. One of their reports indicated that women were excluded from the men's informal network in
part because it was regarded as inappropriate for men and women to travel together or even to have
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Hooters for official business.1 69 Individual women executives expressed
objections to the use by senior management of the terms "little Janie Qs" and
"girls" to refer to female associates in the stores, a request that was ignored.170
The plaintiffs devoted a great deal of effort to substantiating their claims
that "Wal-Mart employs uniform employment and personnel policies
throughout the United States"17' and that the firm took pains to instill a strong
and uniform culture. However, much of their evidence on Wal-Mart's culture
concerned general matters of store management such as the uniformity of
music and temperature throughout Wal-Mart stores.172 Only one example was
presented that bore directly on central management's attitudes towards women:
store managers at the Sam Walton Institute were told that the "reason that so
few women had reached senior management at Wal-Mart was because men
have been more aggressive in achieving those levels of responsibility." 73
Wal-Mart, of course, presented contrary evidence, most notably from
experts who challenged the plaintiffs' statistical analysis. For the moment, I
view the plaintiffs' evidence in the most favorable light, much as a court would
in a summary judgment motion, in order to focus on whether the plaintiffs tied
their evidence to Wal-Mart's subjective employment practices in a way that
might plausibly have met one or more theories of discrimination recognized
under Title VII. I argue that they did not. They conflated various theories; they
did not carefully connect their evidence to each theory; they introduced
irrelevant and confusing evidence; and they omitted certain types of important
evidence. These shortcomings ultimately doomed their case to failure.
B. Lower Court Proceedings
In 2001, the Wal-Mart plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Northern District
of California alleging that local Wal-Mart managers were given "substantial
discretion" in pay and promotion decisions and made those decisions largely
based on subjective judgments of performance. 174 Plaintiffs claimed that this
lunch together. Memorandum from Sharon Bilgischer on Women in Leadership, reprinted in Brief for
Respondents, supra note 6, at 48.
169. Motion for Class Certification, supra note 161, at 12-14. At the annual retreat, senior
executives took part in a quail hunt, a practice which continued even after women participants expressed
discomfort and suggested alternatives such as skiing or river rafting. Id.
170. Id. at 13.
171. Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint, supra note 154, 21 ("Regardless of division, there are
uniform policies for employees, uniform 'orientation' procedures, uniform salary, assignment, pay,
training, and promotion policies. All stores are regularly audited for compliance with these uniform,
company-wide policies and procedures.").
172. Motion for Class Certification, supra note 161, at 8.
173. Id. at 14.
174. Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint 1 22, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137
(N.D. Cal. 2004) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ), aff'd, 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2541
(2011).
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discretion was exercised disproportionately in favor of men. 175 The plaintiffs
requested the certification of a class of about one and a half million plaintiffs
consisting of all female in-store employees.' 76 No suggestion was made that the
class might be divided into subgroups. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and
declaratory relief, punitive damages, and back pay, but not compensatory
damages.
The complaints and motions alleged both disparate treatment and disparate
impact' 77 but spent essentially no time explaining how their facts supported
either theory. Instead, the plaintiffs argued that Wal-Mart created a strong
corporate culture that provided a "conduit"' 78 for discriminatory attitudes at the
corporate level to "infect"l 79 the subjective decision-making processes of its
supervisors. The filings described in detail the factual allegations summarized
in Section HI.A, with an emphasis on evidence of a common culture hostile to
women intended to support a conduit of infection theory.
The plaintiffs' request for relief was couched in the most general possible
terms, without any attempt to specify the types of reforms that would address
their concerns. They asked for "[a] preliminary and permanent injunction
against Defendant . .. from engaging in each of the unlawful practices, policies,
customs and usages set forth herein" and "[s]uch other and further legal and
equitable relief as this Court deems necessary, just and proper."' 80 In 2004, the
district court considered whether the proposed class met the requirements for
certification. Like most courts up until that time, the Wal-Mart trial court
hewed close to the Eisen rule, suggesting that a serious inquiry into the merits
was not appropriate for class certification purposes. ' 8 Without examining in
any detail the distinction between a disparate treatment and a disparate impact
claim, the trial court certified most of the proposed class under 23(b) for claims
of declaratory and injunctive relief, punitive damages, and back pay.' 82 Wal-
Mart immediately appealed the certification.
The Wal-Mart litigation took place during a time of rapid change in the law
of class certification. The power of the new consensus on commonality was
shown when Wal-Mart appealed the class certification. The Ninth Circuit
175. Class claims were limited to pay and promotion, and did not include hiring, hostile work
environment, or retaliation. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 141. Claims of class retaliation, Plaintiffs' First
Amended Complaint, supra note 174, 11 100-01, 104, and a hostile environment, id. I 23j, were made
in the initial complaint, but dropped by the time the plaintiffs' motion for certification was filed.
176. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 141-42.
177. E.g., Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint, supra note 154, T 16.
178. Brief for Respondents, supra note 6, at 13.
179. Id. at 46; see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2548; id. at 2563
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
180. Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint, supra note 154, at 25.
181. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 144.
182. Id. at 188. The certification included the restriction that "class members for whom there is no
available objective data documenting their interest in challenged promotions shall be limited to
injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to plaintiffs' promotion claim." Id.
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ultimately issued three opinions. The first opinion, by a three-judge panel
affirming certification, was withdrawn and reissued to reflect the changing
approach to certification among the circuits.' The final en banc opinions were
sharply divided in part over the stringency of the scrutiny applicable to
plaintiffs' evidence on issues common to the merits and class certification.1 84
The majority certified a 23(b)(2) class with respect to injunctive relief,
declaratory relief, and back pay. It remanded the question of whether a 23(b)(2)
class could pursue a claim for punitive damages, suggesting that the punitive
damage claim might be severed and proceed under 23(b)(3). Wal-Mart
appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the questions of whether
the plaintiffs had established commonality under 23(a) and whether back pay
could be awarded in a 23(b)(2) suit. 186
C. Supreme Court Briefs and Oral Argument
The successive opinions over the course of the Wal-Mart litigation had
clearly indicated a growing acceptance of the new commonality consensus and
a corresponding burden on plaintiffs to articulate more fully key aspects of their
substantive case. The plaintiffs' Supreme Court brief paid slightly more
attention to the distinction between disparate impact and disparate treatment
claims than had their earlier briefs, but it made no attempt to develop each
theory separately.' 87 The issue of business necessity was nowhere mentioned.
Wal-Mart pointed out that "the Ninth Circuit and the district court failed even
to address the intent element, let alone grapple with the fact that determining
whether 'excess subjectivity' was exercised in an intentionally discriminatory
183. Compare Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214, 1225-31 (9th Cir. 2007) with Dukes v.
Wal-Mart, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168, 1177-81 (9th Cir. 2007). The second opinion added a statement stressing
that "courts are not only 'at liberty to' but must 'consider evidence which goes to the requirements of
Rule 23 [at the class certification stage] even [if] the evidence may also relate to the underlying merits of
the case."' 509 F.3d at 1177 n.2 (citation omitted). The second opinion also seemed to apply a more
stringent standard to the plaintiffs evidence. For instance, in allowing certain expert evidence, the
second opinion eliminated the earlier opinion's statement that "courts need not apply the fult Daubert
'gatekeeper' standard at the class certification stage," 474 F.3d at 1227 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)), and instead relied on a conclusion that the gatekeeper analysis was
logically unnecessary, 509 F.3d at 1179.
184. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), rev d, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
185. Id. at 577.
186. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on two questions. The first was whether claims for
monetary relief can be certified under Rule 23(b)(2). In addition, the parties were directed to brief and
argue whether the lower court's grant of certification in Wal-Mart was consistent with Rule 23(a). Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 795 (2010) (citing Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 10-277)).
187. The four-page "Summary of Argument" mentioned the distinction only to aggregate the two
theories: "plaintiffs have identified an 'employment practice'-subjective decision-making adversely
affecting women-that may be challenged under either disparate treatment or disparate impact
analysis." Brief for Respondents, supra note 6, at 4; see also id. at 14, 28 (mentioning the different
theories only to highlight their common features). The brief also recites very general descriptions of
each theory. Id. at 9-10.
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fashion requires individualized proof."' 8 8 In response, plaintiffs correctly noted
that there is a distinction between individual and pattern or practice cases, but
failed to address the nature of this distinction, especially the subtle agency
problems involved in the definition of "intent" in pattern or practice cases.189
Their argument stressed a conduit of infection theory, suggesting that
discrimination resulted from "excessive subjectivity in personnel decisions,
guided by a strong corporate culture infused with sexual stereotyping."l 90
During oral argument, Justice Kennedy requested that plaintiffs' counsel
clarify "the unlawful policy that Wal-Mart has adopted, under your theory of
the case?" Counsel responded, "Justice Kennedy, our theory is that Wal-Mart
provided to its managers unchecked discretion in the way that this Court's
Watson decision addressed that was used [in a discriminatory manner]."'91
Justice Kennedy responded with a question that highlighted a crucial flaw in
the case: 192
JUSTICE KENNEDY: . . . [Y]our complaint faces in two directions.
Number one, you said this is a culture where Arkansas knows, the
headquarters knows, everything that's going on. Then in the next
breath, you say, well, now these supervisors have too much discretion.
It seems to me there's an inconsistency there, and I'm just not sure
what the unlawful policy is. 193
The precise resolution of this apparent inconsistency depends on whether a
disparate impact or disparate treatment claim is being asserted. As defendant's
counsel had conceded earlier, a policy combining discretionary and non-
discretionary standards might be challenged under a disparate impact theory as
long as the plaintiff could identify the problematic practice with specificity.
That Wal-Mart had some loose guidelines need not have been a problem as
long as a significant element of discretion remained, which it in fact did. But by
arguing so forcefully that corporate culture had provided a conduit for the
transmission of discriminatory attitudes, plaintiffs seemed to imply that in
practice little discretion remained, seriously undercutting a disparate impact
claim based on delegation of discretion. The plaintiffs need never have made
this infection argument: as Watson indicated, delegated discretion alone could
188. Brief for Petitioner at 40, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 10-
227).
189. Brief for Respondents, supra note 6, at 4243.
190. Id. at 5.
191. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-227).
192. Lyle Denniston, Argument Recap: A Fatal Flaw Detected?, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 29, 2011,
12:12 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/03/argument-recap-a-fatal-flaw-detected/.
193. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 191, at 27-28. This problem had been noted before
the Supreme Court oral argument by Professor Richard Thompson Ford. Richard Thompson Ford,
Discounting Discrimination: Dukes v. Wal-Mart Proves That Yesterday's Civil Rights Laws Can't Keep
Up with Today's Economy, 5 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 69, 73 (2011).
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have served as a basis for a disparate impact claim. Unfortunately, a Supreme
Court oral argument is a bit late in the game to back down on a point given
such emphasis in earlier stages of litigation.
In principle, a conduit of infection theory might form the basis of a
traditional systemic disparate treatment claim alleging a corporate-level policy
of intentional discrimination. The plaintiffs certainly provided significant
evidence of disturbing attitudes at headquarters. On the facts as a whole,
however, this was a weak claim. Evidence of the transmission of these attitudes
to a widely dispersed set of stores was thin, amounting to a single ambiguous
anecdote about a comment at the Sam Walton Institute. And again Justice
Kennedy's observation applied: if store managers had been guided to make
discriminatory decisions, then their discretion had been constrained, and the
emphasis on subjectivity made no sense.
Even during oral argument, however, the disparate treatment claim could
have been reconstructed as a negligence theory of disparate treatment in which
the challenged practice was not subjectivity as such but instead Wal-Mart's
disregard of evidence of the effects of delegated discretion. The plaintiffs took
one step toward this theory by stressing that a Title VII class action was not
merely an aggregation of individual cases of "unlawful employment
practice[s]" but was based on the separate statutory provision dealing with a
"pattern or practice of resistance."'94 They made no effort, however, to suggest
that an intermediate level of fault would meet the requisite culpability under
this provision. Despite this, the Justices suggested this line of reasoning of their
own accord. In their earlier questions to Wal-Mart's counsel, Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Kennedy had indicated support for a negligence theory
based on notice:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I suppose if corporate headquarters had
learned that the subjective decision-making or the delegation of
decision-making to the field was resulting in several discriminatory
practices or a pattern of discrimination-in other words, the
decentralized process was leading to discrimination-then I suppose
the company-that that could be attributed to the policy adopted by-
at headquarters?
MR. BOUTROUS: No, Your Honor. I think that in this situation, if there
was a pattern, for example, at a particular store where the
decisionmaking unit-
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: No, I'm talking about-so, they've got
thousands of stores, and, you know, every week they get a report from
another store saying that, you know, there's an allegation of gender
194. See supra Part II.
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discrimination. At some point, can't they conclude that it is their
policy of decentralizing decisionmaking that is causing or permitting
that discrimination to take place? 195
Justice Kennedy and Justice Ginsburg followed up with similar
questions.196 When Justice Kennedy raised the critical inconsistency, plaintiffs'
counsel might have responded with the notice-based negligence argument to
which the Court had indicated openness. Instead, the answer of plaintiffs'
counsel amounted to a repetition of the two evidently contradictory principles:
"specific features of the pay and promotion process . .. are totally discretionary
.... But the company also has a very strong corporate culture that ensures that
... the decisions of the managers will be informed by the values the company
provides to these managers in training."197 Later in the oral argument, Justice
Breyer attempted to help plaintiffs' counsel by prompting him with a notice-
based negligence argumentl98 and asking, "[I]s that a question that every one of
the women in this class shares in common?"l 99 Counsel's response evidenced
no understanding of how a notice-based negligence theory differed from a
simple delegation of discretion theory: "I believe so, Justice Breyer, because
they've all been the subject in every one of these stores to this very broad
discretion." 200
The plaintiffs' failure to develop an appropriate culpability standard for
pattern or practice cases again created problems when Justice Kennedy pressed
counsel about the central normative dilemma in structural litigation: to what
extent are employers liable for the problem of discrimination in society as a
whole? Justice Kennedy inquired as to the liability of a company with a very
specific policy against discrimination whose supervisors had discriminatory
views that reflected the level of discrimination generally prevailing in society:
"Where there's no deliberate indifference and a specific policy prohibiting the
discrimination, can you still proceed?" 201 In the same vein, Justice Roberts
inquired whether a class action could be maintained in any instance in which
even a few managers discriminated despite a clear corporate policy against
discrimination. Counsel might have responded that such a company would be
not be liable under a disparate treatment theory but that it might be liable under
195. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 191, at 4-5.
196. Id. at 5-7.
197. Id. at 28-29.
198.
JUSTICE BREYER: Is the-is the common question of law or fact whether, given .... the facts
about what people say and how they behave, many of which central management knew, and
given the results which central management knew or should have known, should central
management under the law have withdrawn some of the subjective discretion in order to stop
these results?
Id. at 36-37.
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a disparate impact theory if it failed to institute measures that could have
prevented discrimination and that failure was not justified by business
necessity. Counsel not only failed to make this critical distinction, but appeared
to reject a negligence theory, implying that Title VII would permit a class
action on a strict vicarious liability basis.202 In doing so, he made two key
errors. First, if his comments are read as a gloss on the pattern or practice
provision, they proposed a standard that is unsupported in current law and is, as
argued in Section I.C, inconsistent with public and judicial views on the
acceptable bounds of discrimination law. Second, this response undermines
commonality: strict vicarious liability is imposed in individual cases, but the
Wal-Mart plaintiffs' commonality argument depended on characterizing their
suit as a pattern or practice claim rather than as an aggregation of individual
cases.
D. The Opinion
The plaintiffs' failures during oral argument all but left the result of Wal-
Mart a foregone conclusion. However, the scope of the opinion and its rationale
were far less predictable.
On the question of commonality the Court split 5-4 and, in a decision
written by Justice Scalia, held that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a
common question under Rule 23(a). The least controversial part of the Rule
23(a) analysis adopted the central premise of the new jurisprudence of class
actions, reaffirming the Falcon holding that consideration of the merits is
sometimes unavoidable and removing any barrier posed by Eisen.203 The
opinion's analysis of Rule 23(a) might well have clarified the role played by
the merits in certification questions, but instead failed to articulate clearly a
standard of proof for plaintiffs to meet. Through its choice of words at various
points, the opinion indicates that the plaintiffs' burden is relatively high: it
rejects "a mere pleading standard" 204 and requires that parties seeking
202.
MR. SELLERS: I-well, I would submit you still can proceed....
JUSTICE ALITO: I understand your answer to JUSTICE KENNEDY's question to bc that this
typical company would be in violation of Title VII; is that correct?
MR. SELLERS: It ... could very well be the case. . . . I think that Title VII holds companies
responsible for the actions they take with respect to their employees. There certainly arc
industries, and there were 30 years-many more 30 or years ago when Teamsters was
decided, where the entire industry might have had evidence of discrimination. That would
not-there is not a negligence standard under this statute that immunizes companies because
they follow the same standards as others.
Id. at 41-42. Counsel was certainly correct that Title VII provides for strict vicarious liability in
individual cases, but without more, such as notice, there is no basis for commonality, and the answer
undermined the plaintiffs' claim that they were proceeding on a pattern or practice theory.
203. This issue was not explicitly discussed in Justice Ginsburg's dissent, which like the majority
makes some assessment of the merits of the case.
204. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011).
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certification "affirmatively demonstrate"205 common questions through
"convincing proof'206 and "rigorous analysis."207 It reaffirms the suggestion in
Falcon that claims of a general policy of discrimination must be demonstrated
by "significant proof.'208 However, the opinion provides little concrete
guidance about the implementation of these principles, 209 instead focusing on
the merits of the plaintiffs' Title VII claim.
Like the plaintiffs, Justice Scalia made no explicit distinction between
disparate treatment and disparate impact theory, apparently assuming that the
same commonality analysis applied to both. Without a legal theory to analyze,
the opinion inevitably became a somewhat unfocused examination of specific
evidentiary issues. I have argued elsewhere that the evaluation of evidence in
discrimination cases unavoidably turns on background assumptions about the
societal pattern of discrimination.210 Justice Scalia's opinion provided an
unusually explicit example of such an assumption:
To the contrary, left to their own devices most managers in any
corporation-and surely most managers in a corporation that forbids
sex discrimination-would select sex-neutral, performance-based
criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at
all. 211
The assumption that "most managers" do not discriminate, which I have called
the Wal-Mart presumption,212 is of great importance: Wal-Mart can be read
broadly to hold that evidence of the discriminatory use of discretion must be
evaluated against the background of the Wal-Mart presumption.213 Justice
Scalia cannot be faulted for making some assumption about the background
rate of discrimination. Such assumptions are unavoidable; indeed, Justice
Ginsburg's dissent itself depends in part on a background assumption, albeit a
very different one.214 Whether the Justices should have provided more support
205. Id.
206. Id. at 2556.
207. Id. at 2551.
208. Id. at 2552.
209. Robert G. Bone, Some Notes on Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, (July 13, 2011) (course
material from ALI-ABA Topical Courses Telephone Seminar/AudioWebcast) (on file with author).
210. Deborah M. Weiss, The Impossibility of Agnostic Discrimination Law, 2011 UTAH L. REV.
(forthcoming May 2012) [hereinafter Weiss, Impossibility], available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1679522.
211. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554.
212. Weiss, Impossibility, supra note 210 (manuscript at 18).
213. Id.
214.
The practice of delegating to supervisors large discretion to make personnel decisions,
uncontrolled by formal standards, has long been known to have the potential to produce
disparate effects. Managers, like all humankind, may be prey to biases of which they
are unaware. The risk of discrimination is heightened when those managers arc
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for their assumptions is a complex question that this Article does not attempt to
address. 215
Justice Scalia assessed the evidence presented against the background of
the Wal-Mart presumption. The plaintiffs' statistical evidence was suggestive
but not without difficulties,216 and even a court with Justice Ginsburg's
background assumptions might have found it of limited probative value. While
Justice Scalia's dismissive tone towards the troubling anecdotal evidence was
unwarranted, he was surely correct that taken by itself it was "too weak to raise
any inference that all the individual, discretionary personnel decisions are
discriminatory."2 17 Those anecdotes, he noted, represented a relatively small
proportion of Wal-Mart's employees-1 in 12,500 as compared with I in 8 in
Teamsters v. United States. The anecdotes supplemented and gave context to
other evidence but by themselves were of limited probative value. Moreover,
both these anecdotes and plaintiffs' statistical evidence suggested that any
218discrimination might have been concentrated in certain geographic areas.
This concentration need not have precluded the certification of all possible
classes, but might have indicated the propriety of certifying regional classes
rather than a company-wide class, a possibility that plaintiffs did not raise.
Plaintiffs may have missed a similar opportunity by not requesting, should
company-wide certification fail, a subclass of women whose promotion to the
store manager level was obstructed by the relocation policy.
The plaintiffs social science evidence also contained flaws that should
have concerned even a Court that had not adopted the Wal-Mart presumption.
Under any legal theory, commonality requires a causal relationship between the
practices challenged and the disparate outcomes that the statistical evidence
purports to show. Plaintiffs attempted to demonstrate this link through the
social framework testimony of Professor Bielby, which the Court criticized,
rightly in my view, for attempting to link general social science to the
219particulars of Wal-Mart's practices. However, such general social science
predominantly of one sex, and are steeped in a corporate culture that perpetuates gender
stereotypes.
Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2564 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
215. On the one hand, the parties did not properly present evidence on this question. On the other
hand, courts have not particularly encouraged them to do so, a situation for which the Supreme Court
bears some responsibility. See Weiss, Impossibility, supra note 210.
216. For example, there was evidence that any discrimination was concentrated in certain
geographic areas, perhaps thus justifying a local but not a nationwide class.
217. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556.
218. The Court noted that more "than half of these reports are concentrated in only six States
(Alabama, California, Florida, Missouri, Texas, and Wisconsin); half of all States have only one or two
anecdotes; and 14 States have no anecdotes about Wal-Mart's operations at all." Id.
219. See John Monahan, Laurens Walker & Gregory Mitchell, Contextual Evidence of Gender
Discrimination: The Ascendance of "Social Frameworks, " 94 VA. L. REV. 1715 (2008). But see Melissa
Hart & Paul M. Secunda, A Matter of Context: Social Framework Evidence in Employment
Discrimination Class Actions, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 37 (2009) (arguing that experts should be permitted
to make links between general evidence and specifics of case).
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testimony should have been admissible had the plaintiffs instead used it to
provide evidence of the societal level of discrimination, about which both
Justice Scalia and Justice Ginsburg clearly made assumptions.220 In addition,
more rigorous studies of the effects of Wal-Mart's practices should also have
been admissible had they been offered. 22 1 The Court's rejection of Bielby's
testimony in this case should not preclude subsequent plaintiffs from
introducing better social framework testimony in the future.
The Court could have defensibly denied certification of a nationwide class
because of the plaintiffs' imperfect evidence and their weak theoretical
arguments. On a disparate impact claim, whether based on aggregation or
pattern or practice, the Court might have concluded that plaintiffs had failed to
identify a practice with specificity because their emphasis on a uniform
corporate culture undermined their identification of delegated discretion as the
problematic policy. Likewise, the Court might defensibly have rejected the two
disparate treatment theories mostly easily culled from the plaintiffs' argument:
the evidence that any corporate-level intent was actually conveyed to store
management was weak, and the mere delegation of discretion without
negligence should not constitute a cognizable practice supporting commonality
under a disparate treatment theory. Since the notice-based negligence theory
had been raised in oral argument though not in the briefs, the opinion might
have explicitly reserved judgment on a notice argument.
But Justice Scalia went much further than this. Since Justice Scalia made
no explicit distinction between disparate treatment and disparate impact theory,
the opinion can be read to imply that the theoretical basis of a plaintiffs' case
has no relevance to commonality, thus seeming to reject any possible grounds
for class certification of challenges to delegated discretion. In one passage, he
wrote that the commonality requirement would not be met even if statistical
evidence established a significant discrepancy in each store, since each store
manager would offer a different defense based on factors such as the conditions
in the local labor market:
[D]emonstrating the invalidity of one manager's use of discretion will
do nothing to demonstrate the invalidity of another's. A party seeking
to certify a nationwide class will be unable to show that all the
employees' Title VII claims will in fact depend on the answers to
common questions.222
220. Weiss, Impossibility, supra note 210 (manuscript at 18, 20).
221. See Gregory Mitchell, Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Beyond Context: Social Facts as
Case-Specific Evidence, 60 EMORY L.J. 1109 (2011). See generally Weiss, Impossibility, supra note 210
(arguing that general evidence is relevant to background assumptions).
222. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554.
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In isolation, this passage seems to preclude any certification of a class
challenging the subjective practices of a large company. In context, however, it
might be taken to say that even the strongest statistical evidence alone cannot
establish commonality when the defendant is as large and decentralized as Wal-
Mart. Thus viewed, it would not preclude a pattern or practice claim of
disparate treatment or disparate impact based on negligence, where the
challenged practice was failure to act rather than delegation by itself.
A more difficult question is whether Wal-Mart can be distinguished in a
future disparate impact claim. Since Wal-Mart does not purport to overrule
Watson, the critical issue may be the opinion's effect on Watson. Watson notes:
[T]he plaintiffs burden in establishing a prima facie case goes beyond
the need to show that there are statistical disparities in the employer's
work force. The plaintiff must begin by identifying the specific
employment practice that is challenged .... Especially in cases where
an employer combines subjective criteria with the use of more rigid
standardized rules or tests, the plaintiff is in our view responsible for
isolating and identifying the specific employment practices that are
allegedly responsible for any observed statistical disparities.223
The plaintiffs' uniform culture argument in Wal-Mart obscured the
identification of discretion as a specific practice, justifying the Court's finding
that plaintiffs had failed to meet this requirement. The Wal-Mart opinion,
however, does not frame the problem in this way:
"[T]he plaintiff must begin by identifying the specific employment
practice that is challenged. " . . . That is all the more necessary when a
class of plaintiffs is sought to be certified. Other than the bare
existence of delegated discretion, respondents have identified no
"specific employment practice"-much less one that ties all their 1.5
million claims together. 224
This Wal-Mart passage completely changes the meaning of the Watson
language from which it selectively quotes. Watson requires that the plaintiff
separate the subjective practice from objective practices and convincingly show
that the subjective practice causes the observed discrepancy. Wal-Mart seems
to transform this into a requirement that plaintiffs show a practice in addition to
delegated discretion, a requirement that does not appear anywhere in Watson.
Future courts have the following choice. They can take this Wal-Mart passage
at face value, in effect overruling Watson even though Wal-Mart does not
admit to doing so. Alternatively, they can draw on Justice Kennedy's concern
223. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988) (emphasis added).
224. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2555-56 (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 994) (emphasis added).
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in the oral argument and find that the Wal-Mart plaintiffs failed to meet their
burden of identification by not separating discretionary from non-discretionary
practices, and indeed aggravated this problem by their insistence that Wal-Mart
had a uniform corporate culture. Such an interpretation would allow future
plaintiffs to challenge mixed evaluation systems by carefully delineating the
problematic subjective component and demonstrating that it caused the
statistical discrepancy at issue.
That Wal-Mart bars all class-wide litigation of subjective practice claims is
suggested by another statement elsewhere in the opinion:
The only corporate policy that the plaintiffs' evidence convincingly
establishes is Wal-Mart's "policy" of allowing discretion by local
supervisors over employment matters. On its face, of course, that is
just the opposite of a uniform employment practice that would provide
the commonality needed for a class action; it is a policy against having
225
uniform employment practices.
This glib formulation flatly contradicts Watson, which Wal-Mart claims to
follow. A true policy "against" having uniform policies would consist of a
prohibition of the adoption of common policies, which of course Wal-Mart did
not have. Even the absence of a policy would consist of the lack of any rules
whatsoever for making personnel decisions but the delegation of discretion to
supervisors is itself a rule. The problem of commonality in Wal-Mart raises
serious doctrinal and policy issues and the difficult task of analyzing them is
not served by word-play. I can only hope that future courts will take the "on its
face" clause as an implicit notice that what follows is not to be taken as a full
analysis.
A unanimous portion of the Wal-Mart opinion examined the scope of relief
for a class certified under Rule 23(b)(2), which is available when "the party
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable
to the class," so that class-wide injunctive relief would be appropriate. The
Court held that no claim that included individualized relief, including back pay,
could meet the requirements of 23(b)(2), leaving open the question of whether
attorney's fees or punitive damages are available to a 23(b)(2) class. The
question of whether any individualized relief should be available under
23(b)(2) is perhaps somewhat more complex than Justice Scalia's ever-
confident tone would indicate, but the Court's reasoning, anticipated in an
earlier decision, is at least plausible. 2 26 This holding turns only peripherally on
substantive Title VII issues and to evaluate it is beyond the scope of this
Article; for present purposes its principal significance is whether the options it
225. Id. at 2554.
226. See Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 121 (1994) (per curiam).
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leaves open for plaintiffs are adequate to allow future structural litigation. This
question will be taken up in the next Section, which examines whether
structural claims are still viable after Wal-Mart.
E. The Future
The central mistake of the Wal-Mart plaintiffs was to insist that their case
involved a clear and unmistakable intent to discriminate by central
management. If they had argued instead that Wal-Mart management
negligently failed to act after notice, their theory would in all likelihood have
satisfied a majority of the Court that a common question could exist in
principle and possibly that a common question did exist under the facts
presented.
Had a negligence theory been presented, the resulting opinion would
probably have looked quite different. But the Wal-Mart opinion is what it is,
and it now contains language that poses obstacles to future structural plaintiffs
challenging delegated discretion, even those who present a negligence theory
firmly grounded in disparate treatment or disparate impact theory. As the
previous Section suggested, the problematic language in Wal-Mart might be
distinguished. The critical question is whether a future Court will want to
distinguish it. Their desire to do so will depend in significant part on the overall
tone of plaintiffs' argument and on the relief requested.
During oral argument, plaintiffs' counsel insisted that the facts of Wal-
Mart were "really extraordinary."227 They were not. Really extraordinary facts
do still arise in discrimination litigation. In Brown v. Nucor, a delegated
discretion case litigated during the same time period as Wal-Mart, plaintiffs
presented evidence that
white supervisors and employees frequently referred to black
employees as "nigger," "bologna lips," "yard ape," and "porch
monkey." White employees frequently referred to the black employees
as "DAN," which stood for "dumb ass nigger." These racial epithets
were broadcast over the plant-wide radio system, along with "Dixie"
and "High Cotton." 228
The principal elements of the Wal-Mart plaintiffs' case did not approach
this level of egregious animus. Some anecdotes, relevant to be sure, described
the open expression of attitudes thoroughly inconsistent with the fair treatment
of women. But such expressions were rare, and open misogyny rarer still.
Many executives who failed to act, and indeed many of the supervisors who
227. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 191, at 36.
228. Brown v. Nucor Corp., 576 F.3d 144, 151 (4th Cir. 2009).
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made discriminatory decisions, may have sincerely believed that sex
discrimination was wrong. For the most part, the plaintiffs' case rested on the
pervasiveness of quieter and most likely unconscious views about the
competence of female employees. Such views are a problem that Title VII must
address, but they are not "extraordinary." Discrimination plaintiffs who
exaggerate the wrong they seek to redress risk not only losing their case but
setting back the cause of eliminating discrimination. In the words of Professor
Bartlett,
[T]hreat and confrontation about race and gender bias, which people
do not want to possess or exhibit, may inadvertently provoke shame,
guilt, and resentment, which lead to avoidance and resistance, and
ultimately to more stereotyping. In other words, pressure and threat
will often deepen bias rather than correct it.229
These words primarily address the effect of confrontation on employers,
but the general principles apply to many judges and juries as well. They will
wonder if they themselves might have engaged in the conduct of which
defendants are accused, provoking defensiveness and resistance if they are
asked to condemn the defendant's conduct with the severity appropriate in a
case like Nucor. Such backlash can only be avoided if plaintiffs refrain from
sweeping accusations of animus and, as a corollary, do not request punitive
damages.
A negligence theory, presented without exaggeration of the moral wrong
involved, will go a long way toward improving the chances that future
structural discrimination claims will succeed. Even this strategy, however, will
be rendered ineffective by an inadequately developed request for remedies. The
Wal-Mart plaintiffs fell seriously short of the goal of a well-worked out
proposal for injunctive relief. They made a general and conclusory request for
an "injunction against Defendant . . . from engaging in each of the unlawful
practices, policies, customs and usages set forth herein" and "[s]uch other and
further legal and equitable relief as this Court deems necessary, just and
proper."230 In his report, Dr. Bielby, plaintiffs' sole expert, listed several more
specific mechanisms that might be used to reduce discrimination231 but these
were not referred to anywhere in the defendant's motions or briefs. Even this
report fell short of the ideal support for a request for an injunction. Dr. Bielby
is a respected sociologist who is well-qualified to express views on the overall
prevalence of discrimination and the general type of mechanism that might
229. Bartlett, supra note 35, at 1901.
230. Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint, supra note 154, at 25.
231. Declaration of William T. Bielby, Ph.D. in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification, supra note 165, at 32.
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reduce its expression.232 He is not, however, an industrial organization (1-0)
psychologist. To suggest as he did that discrimination can be reduced though a
"systematic job analysis" of what "constitutes job-relevant information"2" is in
my view correct, but it is a far cry from the level of specificity needed to
evaluate specific personnel procedures or to issue a useful injunction. For these
purposes only an 1-0 psychologist or someone with comparable training will
suffice. 234
The need for careful job analysis underscores another limitation on future
claims: even under a notice theory, division into subclasses by job or
geography may be necessary. The appropriate injunctive relief may well vary
by job class, and indeed liability itself may vary among job groups. A given
practice, for example, may meet a business necessity test for some job
classifications but not others.
Plaintiffs will only pursue injunctive relief if they are financially able to do
so. Wal-Mart changed future plaintiffs' incentives by holding that
individualized relief was not available to a 23(b)(2) class, precluding all
individual compensatory damages, including back pay, in 23(b)(2) suits.
However, even without such damages, the 23(b)(2) class may remain useful in
structural cases seeking injunctive relief as long as such classes may be granted
attorney's fees and costs. Wal-Mart only precludes individualized relief to
23(b)(2) classes, leaving open the possibility of "'incidental' . . . 'damages that
flow directly from liability to the class as a whole on the claims forming the
basis of the injunctive or declaratory relief."' 235 Attorney's fees and costs
incurred to obtain class-wide injunctive relief are not individualized and "flow
directly from liability to the class as a whole," and are thus not foreclosed by
Wal-Mart. To exclude them from 23(b)(2) class relief would severely curtail
236the private enforcement of Title VII clearly intended by Congress. The Wal-
Mart opinion gives future courts no reason to disallow this relief, since awards
of fees and costs raise neither the concerns about judicial economy nor those of
unfairness on which the exclusion of individual damages was based.
The greatest uncertainty facing future structural classes is whether
individual damages will be realistically available. Individual damages might be
pursued by several routes. In one option, the bundled approach, a single class
certified under 23(b)(3) pursues all available remedies. In the alternative
option, the hybrid approach, a class certified under 23(c)(4) and 23(b)(2) seeks
232. Id. at 3-4. For an example of his work, see William T. Bielby, Minimizing Workplace Gender
and Racial Bias, 29 CONTEMP. Soc. 120 (2000).
233. Bielby, supra note 232, at 124.
234. The difficult task of providing adequate expert guidance is examined further in Weiss,
Misplaced Modesty, supra note 37.
235. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560 (2011) (quoting Allison v. Citgo
Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998)).
236. See supra Subsection liC.I.
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to establish liability and obtain injunctive relief. If liability is established,
individual proceedings and subclasses certified under 23(b)(3) pursue
individual monetary relief.
The hybrid and bundled approaches have different costs and benefits for
plaintiffs. Rule 23(b)(3) requires that class issues "predominate." It directs the
court to consider whether a class action is the best way to "fairly and efficiently
adjudicat[e] [] the controversy" 237 and in doing so to consider "the likely
difficulties in managing a class action."238 The 23(b)(3) language is inherently
comparative, requiring an assessment of the relative importance of common
and individual claims. In a hybrid suit, the 23(b)(3) class contains only
individual damage claims and may well fail the predominance test. However, if
the 23(b)(2) class is certified and prevails, individual plaintiffs may pursue their
damage claims using the result, which will shift the burden to the defendant to
prove lack of causation. When the injunctive and individual damage claims are
bundled together into a single 23(b)(3) class, the collective claims are more
likely to be found to predominate, permitting class litigation of the individual
damage claims. However, predominance is not assured, and the whole claim,
including that for injunctive relief, may fail. Moreover, even to pursue
injunctive relief, a bundled class must incur the higher notice costs required by
23(b)(3). In contrast, the 23(b)(2) class used for injunctive relief in a hybrid
approach has no notice costs and avoids the predominance problem. Thus, the
hybrid approach provides plaintiffs with lower costs and a higher likelihood of
success on the injunctive claim in return for a lower likelihood that individual
damage claims can be litigated on a class basis. 239
A specific and persuasive claim for class-wide injunctive relief would also
raise the possibility of certification under Rule 23(b)(1), which provides for
class certification when separate actions would create a risk of inconsistent
adjudications that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
defendant. Perhaps because of the ready availability of other theories in the
past, few reported Title VII cases have been brought under that section.240
However, an employer must adopt uniform practices for all workers, and will
be unable to comply if a multitude of individual suits yield conflicting
injunctions. Employment discrimination actions seeking an injunction
237. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
238. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(D).
239. Some courts may reject the hybrid approach because they are reluctant to make use of issue
classes. This reluctance is generally disapproved by commentators. E.g., Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline
of Class Actions 75-84 (March 12, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
240. LARSON, supra note 148, § 81.07[1]. Larson cites only one case, Dennison v. City Dep't of
Water & Power, No. 73-1965-F, 1975 WL 220 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 1975). The potential application of
23(b)(1) is discussed in Michael Fischl, The Proper Scope of Representation in Title VII Class Actions:
A Comment on East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 175,
190-91, 196-97 (1978) and Rutherglen, Title VII Class Actions, supra note 83, at 704-05.
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reforming personnel practices would seem to be potential candidates for
certification under 23(b)(1).
Any analysis of how these options affect the incentive to litigate and the
value of recovery is highly speculative. It is perfectly possible that the details of
how damage claims are certified will matter little. As numerous observers have
noted, class certification today almost invariably results in settlement. Perhaps
the certification of a suit for injunctive relief under 23(b)(2) will have the same
effect in the future as it did before Wal-Mart. The availability of attorneys' fees
and costs may provide sufficient incentive to pursue injunctive relief, and
although not all employees may have damage claims that are worth
241pursuing, the prospect of numerous individual lawsuits may induce
defendants who lose at the certification phase to include monetary
compensation in any settlement. Only time can answer these questions.
Since Wal-Mart, four opinions have considered challenges to delegated
242discretion in large firms with multiple units and supervisors. No clear
forecast of future law emerges from these cases. Most broadly interpreted, Wal-
Mart presents a complete bar to class certification of challenges to delegated
discretion, a view that has been adopted in full by one unpublished district
court opinion.243 In each of the remaining three cases, the court indicated at
least an implicit willingness to narrow Wal-Mart. Nonetheless, the basis in each
for limiting Wal-Mart is not always clear and appears to vary among the cases.
The Ninth Circuit indicated an inclination to disregard the broader dicta in
Wal-Mart and to treat the Wal-Mart plaintiffs' loss as a failure of proof.244 In
Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., the Second Circuit finessed the
inconsistencies between Wal-Mart and Watson: it paraphrased the broad
holding of Wal-Mart, then immediately quoted the conflicting language in
241. A relatively new employee, for example, may be entitled to prospective injunctive relief yet
have no serious case for damages.
242. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 11-3639. 2012 WL 592745
(7th Cir. Feb. 24, 2012); Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2011); Chen-Oster v.
Goldman, Sachs & Co, No. 10 Civ. 6950(LBS)(JCF), 2012 WL 205875 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012); Bell
v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 270 F.R.D. 186 (D.N.J. 2010). Another case included some allegations of
impermissible subjectivity in addition to many other practices, making Wal-Mart only marginally
relevant. Grant v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 446 F. App'x 737 (6th Cir.
2011). In addition, plaintiffs have lost a similar case for reasons that suggest little about the future of
such litigation. Scott v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., No. 3:08CV540, 2012 WL 113657, at *4 (W.D.N.C.
Jan. 13, 2012) (prior to Supreme Court opinion in Wal-Mart plaintiffs argued their case
indistinguishable from Wal-Mart). The size of the class and numerosity of stores were clearly central to
Wal-Mart, and thus courts view Wal-Mart as having little application to small single-establishment
firms. Cronas v. Willis Grp. Holdings, Ltd., No. 06 Civ. 15295 (RMB), 2007 WL 5007976, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2011); Delagarza v. Tesoro Ref. & Mktg. Co., No. C-09-5803 EMC, 2011 WL
4017967, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2011).
243. Bell, 270 F.R.D. 186.
244. Ellis, 657 F.3d at 982. ("in Wal-Mart, for example, the Supreme Court considered whether the
statistical and sociological studies cited by the plaintiffs were sufficient to link the alleged
discriminatory practice to harm suffered by the entire class."); see also id. at 982-84 (discussing
requisites for proof of a common issue).
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Watson without comment. 245 It contrasted the facts of Wal-Mart with those at
issue by suggesting that plaintiffs had identified more specific policies than
those at issue in Wal-Mart, yet one such policy was described as the "tap on the
shoulder" approach to promotion,246 precisely the terminology used by the
Wal-Mart plaintiffs. 247
A particularly interesting case is McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, a Seventh
Circuit opinion by Judge Richard Posner, which certified a class charging
Merrill Lynch with race discrimination against its brokers. The opinion
provides several characterizations of the Wal-Mart holding, including the broad
interpretation that delegations of discretion to managers can never constitute an
employment practice supporting commonality.248 However, McReynolds held
that commonality was supported by another policy that allegedly facilitated
discrimination by coworkers-allowing broker-coworkers to form teams. The
basic agency principles incorporated into Title V11 24 9 impose less entity
liability for the acts of coworkers than of supervisors, suggesting that some
other factor lay behind the court's decision to distinguish Wal-Mart.
That McReynolds was clearly based on a disparate impact theory may have
played a key role in the plaintiffs' success. Purely as a matter of logic, disparate
impact is intrinsically collective in a way that disparate treatment is not and
thus more readily supports a finding of a common question.250 Still, Posner did
not make this distinction explicitly. The real value for plaintiffs of the disparate
impact theory may have derived from the comparatively mild moral judgment
it makes of defendants: the McReynolds opinion mentions several times that
corporate-level intent had not been alleged and that punitive damages would
not, without more, be available.251
245.
[T]hc [Dukes] Court found proof of a general policy of discrimination entirely absent in light
of the fact that the defendant's only policy with regard to promotion and pay decisions was
one of unfettered managerial discretion. Nonetheless, "an employer's undisciplined system of
subjective decisionmaking [can have] precisely the same effects as a system pervaded by
impermissible intentional discrimination."
Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 2012 WL 205875, at *5 (last alteration in original) (quoting
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990-91 (1988)).
246. Id. at *3.
247. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2563 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
248. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. I1-3639. 2012 WL 592745,
at *5 (7th Cir. Feb. 24, 2012) ("[B]ecause there was no company-wide policy to challenge in Wal-
Mart-the only relevant corporate policies were a policy forbidding sex discrimination and a policy of
delegating employment decisions to local managers-there was no common issue to justify class
treatment.").
249. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775 (1998).
250. See supra Subsection II.B.2.b.
251. McReynolds, 2012 WL 592745, at *7 ("There is no indication that the corporate level of
Merrill Lynch (or its parent, Bank of America) wants to discriminate against black brokers. Probably it
just wants to maximize profits. But in a disparate impact case the presence or absence of discriminatory
intent is irrelevant .... ).
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The McReynolds plaintiffs were clearly helped as well by their adoption of
a hybrid strategy. They requested certification of a class under 23(c)(4) on the
issue of disparate impact and under 23(b)(2) for injunctive relief.252 Although
they indicated they might pursue certification under 23(b)(3) for purposes of
compensatory and punitive damages under a disparate treatment theory,
Posner's obvious skepticism about such a class was, as he stressed, immaterial
253to the case at hand. Like the more muted disapproval implicit in disparate
impact theory, this focus on injunctive relief rather than damages made the
plaintiffs' more sympathetic, and thus increased the court's willingness to look
for grounds to distinguish the case from Wal-Mart.
Taken as a whole, these cases suggest little progress towards putting
structural litigation on a truly sound doctrinal footing. Yet they also indicate
that sensible legal strategy will go some way towards limiting the less cautious
language in Wal-Mart. None of the plaintiffs made the most egregious mistakes
of the Wal-Mart plaintiffs: all focused on concrete practices and none confused
the delegation of discretion issue by making a conduit of infection argument.
Most importantly, McReynolds suggests that even judges not known for pro-
plaintiff sympathies can give structural suits a fair hearing when plaintiffs
modulate the tone of their argument and place reasonable limits on the relief
they request.
CONCLUSION
Many observers have decried the poor success rate of employment
discrimination plaintiffs in federal court, and most have suggested that the
judiciary's lack of sympathy for them plays a principal role. 254 The high loss
rates for plaintiffs have many causes and the policy views of many judges may
be one of them. But there is plenty of blame to go around, and some of it must
go to the plaintiffs' bar.
Long before Wal-Mart, courts had displayed some reluctance to certify
structural class actions. Some courts had expressed frustration that the facts
presented pointed to the possibility of discrimination but that plaintiffs had
failed to develop a legal theory to support commonality. 255 In other
discrimination contexts, even observers sympathetic to discrimination claims
252. Id. at*1.
253. See id. at *9.
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have raised similar concerns about the failure of plaintiffs' counsels to think
through their arguments sufficiently. 256
Wal-Mart need not spell the end of class challenges to subjective practices
as long as plaintiffs heed its lessons. The new consensus on commonality
dictates an increased role for certain merits issues at the certification stage. In
cases challenging subjective decisionmaking, plaintiffs must pay far more
attention to the distinction between disparate impact and disparate treatment
theory and the statutory basis for their proposed claim.
These doctrinal issues are not simply obstacles on the road to justice. The
distinction between disparate treatment and disparate impact claims reflects
moral judgments about the significance of different behavior, reflected in the
very different damage schemes available for the two theories. A negligence
theory of liability reflects a notion of intermediate fault that even the majority
in Wal-Mart indicated it could accept.
Greater attention to the link between the merits and commonality would
not simply permit plaintiffs to navigate around Wal-Mart, but could also spur
the development of doctrinal guidelines for employers. Until now, class
certification has been the first rather than the last step in litigating class
employment discrimination claims. If a class is certified, the case usually
settles, foreclosing the possibility of a trial and a reasoned opinion on the
merits. As a result, much important doctrine remains underdeveloped. The
dearth of final judgments creates a vacuum in which employees and employers
have no guidance about their rights and obligations. Employers are unlikely to
devise structures to prevent discrimination if they cannot rely on these
structures to keep them out of court. This situation benefits no one. Neither
plaintiffs nor defendants are well-served by uncertainty about the obligations of
employers, and more extensive examination of the merits at the phase of class
certification would reduce this uncertainty. Plaintiffs seeking class certification
must present clearly developed theories of liability and appropriately specific
requests for relief. Only when the plaintiffs' bar begins to sweat such doctrinal
details can their clients' chances of prevailing begin to improve.
256. George Rutherglen, Ricci v. DeStefano: Affirmative Action and the Lessons ofAdversity, 2009
SUP. CT. REV. 83, 90-91 (arguing that city's refusal to abandon position that tests were valid
compromised its defense).
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